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Financial development is an important condition for sustainable growth. 
Improvements in the key functions of the financial sector promote economic growth 
through capital accumulation and technological progress. Furthermore, they foster 
productivity, mobilise savings and investment and broaden access to finance in the 
population.  However, the finance-growth relationship is much more complex and 
deserves further exploration, because the growth based on financial development may be 
excessive and can endanger an economy, resulting in an economic crisis that would take 
its tolls on everyone.  
The Global Financial Crisis in 2008 shed the light on possible causes of risks’ 
build-ups which increase the probability and severity of crises and emphasized the need 
to develop macroeconomic models to study the interactions between financial system and 
real economy. As a response, multiple policies have been put forward by academics, 
central banks, regulators and other policy makers, aiming at preventing the systemic risk 
build-ups and thus reducing the likelihood and impacts of crises on the financial sector 
and the economy as a whole, because stable economic and financial environments are 
necessary conditions for growth. 
The importance of a sound regulatory framework grows as the financial 
development progresses. One of the newly emphasized policies is the macroprudential 
policy which aims at promoting financial stability. Macroprudential policy measures 
avert the emergence of financial imbalances and build resilience in the financial sector in 
good times, so the financial intermediation and lending can support the economy in bad 
times. As a relatively new policy, it attracts the attention of researchers who study its use, 
effectiveness and interactions with other existing policies to identify its impacts on 
financial sector developments and economic growth. 
This thesis focuses on separate and joint interactions between financial 
development, macroprudential policy and economic growth in a monetary union. 
The main aim is to identify implications of financial development and macroprudential 
policy for economic growth in the selected panel of European Union countries from both 
theoretical and empirical perspective. The theoretical perspective provides a framework 
of existing literature and approaches to the topic while the empirical perspective examines 
the implications in different model specifications, based on the theoretical framework. 
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The diploma thesis is divided in three thematic chapters which are complemented 
by an introduction and a conclusion. First thematic chapter defines key terms of the thesis 
and thus provide a theoretical framework for further research. After that, a review of 
relevant literature focusing on interactions between analysed phenomena (financial 
development-economic growth, financial development-macroprudential policy, 
macroprudential policy-economic growth, macroprudential policy-other public policies) 
is conducted to provide an overview of previous studies and approaches to the 
phenomena. 
Second thematic chapter contains data and stylised facts on the countries in the 
panel. First part of the chapter analyses financial and banking sectors in the panel of 
countries, focusing on its size and role in each economy. Second part focuses on 
macroprudential policy – how it is approached on different levels, its legal and 
institutional framework and the appropriate instruments. Third part is about monetary 
policy as one of the key common features in the panel of countries. Fourth part combines 
outcomes from the two previous parts and explains institutional frameworks of 
macroprudential and monetary policy in the countries. Last part of this chapter is about 
definition and analysis of available data for analysed phenomena. 
Third thematic chapter is an empirical analysis of interactions between financial 
development, economic growth and macroprudential policy. First part of the chapter 
provides a theoretical framework, specifications of the models and analysis of input data. 
In the second part, results for baseline model (implications of financial development for 
economic growth) is presented. In the third part, macroprudential policy is added to the 
extended model specification together with sub-dimensions of financial development. 
Fourth part includes robustness checks for the above-mentioned model specifications and 
the last part compares the results to the economic theory and provides some policy 
implications on conduct of macroprudential policy. 
The theoretical framework presented in the diploma thesis is based on professional 
books, seminal studies published in internationally recognised journals and official 
publications of relevant institutions. The data used in the empirical analysis are taken 
from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the World Bank, the 
European Commission and Vienna Institute of Economics and further processed in Stata. 
 7 
2 Theoretical framework and literature review of 
the analysed phenomena  
This chapter aims at defining the key phenomena related to this diploma thesis. 
Every phenomenon is provided with a definition, key aspects and further elaboration 
based on review of existing theoretical frameworks and models. After that, interaction 
between each of the phenomena is analysed by review of relevant empirical studies.  
2.1 Financial development: definition and measurement  
2.1.1 Definition of financial development  
Financial development is defined by Levine (2005) as improvements in 
the quality of key functions of the financial sector:  
• production of ex ante information about possible investments,  
• monitoring of investments and implementation of corporate governance,   
• trading, diversification and management of risk, 
• mobilisation and pooling of savings, 
• exchange of goods and services. 
At the conceptual level, financial development occurs when in the financial sector, 
instruments, markets and intermediaries mitigate (not necessarily eliminate) the effects 
of imperfect information, limited enforcement of contracts and transaction costs (Čihák 
et al., 2012).  
Financial sector is divided in six parts by Cecchetti and Schoenholtz (2011): 
• money which is used to pay for purchases and storage of wealth, 
• financial instruments (e. g. stocks, mortgages and insurance policies) which are used 
for transfer of resources from savers to investors and for transfer of risk to those who 
are best equipped to bear it, 
• financial markets (e. g. stock exchange) which allow us to buy and sell financial 
instruments, 
• financial institutions which provide access to the financial markets and collection of 
information about prospective borrowers to ensure their creditworthiness, 
• regulatory agencies responsible for making sure that financial sector elements 
(including its instruments, markets and institutions) operate in a safe and reliable way, 
• central banks which monitor and stabilise the economy. 
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The structure of financial sector varies across countries and changes as countries develop 
(Boyd and Smith, 1986). According to King and Levine (1993), it is affected by: 
• technological improvements which lower transaction costs and affect financial 
arrangements (Merton, 1992); 
• monetary and fiscal policies have an impact on taxation of financial intermediaries 
and the provision of financial services (Bencivenga et al. 1995; Roubini and Sala-i-
Martín 1995); 
• legal system which determine financial systems (La Porta et al., 1996); 
• political changes and national institutional arrangements which critically influence 
financial development (Haber, 1991). 
2.1.2 Measures of financial development 
A good measurement is crucial to assess the development in the financial sector 
and to understand the impact of this development on economic growth. As this 
phenomenon has several dimensions, indicators which are used for measuring the 
financial development are rough approximations and cannot capture all of its aspects. 
Empirical studies are usually based on proxies such as liquid liabilities to GDP, bank 
credit to the sum of bank credit and domestic assets of the central bank, domestic credit 
to GDP, credit allocated to private enterprises to GDP, stock market capitalisation ratio, 
stock market activity, stock market turnover ratio, overall stock market development, 
share of resources devoted to the financial system and deposit money bank assets to GDP. 
However, these capture separate aspects of financial development while this thesis 
focuses on aggregated financial development and aggregated development of two key 
aspects – institutions and markets. 
Čihák et al. (2012) introduce the Global Financial Development Database which 
contains characteristics of financial system for 214 economies. In the database, there are 
annual data from 1960 to 2017 for 109 indicators, capturing various aspects of financial 
institutions and markets. The database includes measures of depth, access, efficiency and 
stability both for financial institutions (banks and other financial intermediaries), and 
financial markets (e. g. stock markets and bond markets). Svirydzenka (2016) follows the 
principles set by Čihák et al. (2012) and introduces nine indices summarising how 
developed financial institutions and financial markets are in terms of their depth, access, 
and efficiency. The sub-indices are aggregated into an overall index of financial 
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development which covers 183 countries on annual frequency between 1980 and 2017. 
Further in the thesis, I employ this index due to its aggregated approach to the 
phenomenon of financial development. 
2.2 Economic growth: history, paradigms and measurement 
Economic growth of a country is “a sustained increase in its population and 
product per capita” (Shearer, 1961). Since economic growth is a multidimensional 
phenomenon, increases in income and consumption do not necessarily implicate 
sustained improvements in living standards (OECD, 2014). 
Todaro and Smith (2012) identify three main sources of economic growth: 
• capital accumulation which includes all new investments in land, physical equipment 
and human resources by improvements in health, education and job skills; 
• growth in population and hence eventual growth in the labour force;  
• technological progress in new ways of accomplishing traditional tasks.  
2.2.1 History of economic growth theories 
From a chronological point of view, the starting point for modern growth theory 
is the work of Ramsey (1928), whose intertemporally separable utility function is widely 
used today as the Cobb-Douglas production function, despite that the economics 
profession did not accept or widely use this approach until the 1960s. Harrod (1939) and 
Domar (1946) attempted to integrate Keynesian analysis with elements of economic 
growth by using productivity functions with little substitutability among the inputs to 
argue that the capitalist system is inherently unstable. Since their work was written during 
or immediately after the Great Depression, their presented arguments were received 
sympathetically by many economists and these contributions triggered a good deal of 
research at the time; however, very little of this plays a role in contemporary thoughts 
(Barro and Sala-i-Martín, 2004).  
The next impactful contributions are from Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) who 
presented the Solow-Swan model, neoclassical form of the production factor assuming 
constant returns to scale, diminishing returns to each input and some positive and smooth 
substitution elasticity between the inputs. By combining this model with a constant-
saving-rate rule, it becomes an extremely simple general-equilibrium model of 
the economy. As stated in Barro and Sala-i-Martín (2004), there are two predictions from 
these models: 
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• conditional convergence: the lower the starting level of GDP per capita (relative to 
the long-run/steady-state position), the faster the growth rate; 
• diminishing returns to capital: in the absence of continuous technology 
improvements, growth per capita must eventually cease. 
In late 1950s and 1960s, neoclassical growth theorists recognised this modelling 
deficiency by assuming that technological progress occurred in an endogenous manner, 
so the growth model explains everything but long-run growth which is entirely 
determined by the rate of technological progress which stands outside the model (Barro 
and Sala-i-Martín, 2004). 
Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1963) bring the analysis of consumer optimisation 
from Ramsey back into the neoclassical growth model and provided for an endogenous 
determination of the saving rate, allowing for richer transitional dynamics while tending 
to preserve the conditional convergence hypothesis and not eliminating the dependence 
of long-run growth rate per capita on exogenous technological progress. Their work 
completed the basic neoclassical growth model, but later researches have shown its 
extensions which allow for heterogeneity among households (Caselli and Ventura, 2000) 
and to incorporate preferences inconsistent in time (Barro, 1999).  
After downturn in 1970s, research of economic growth experienced a boom which 
was initiated by work of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) who were motivated by the fact 
that determinants of long-run economic growth are much more important than the 
mechanics of business cycles or the countercyclical mechanisms of monetary and fiscal 
policies. Romer (1986), Lucas (1988) and Rebelo (1991) built on the research done by 
Arrow (1961), Sheshinski (1967), and Uzawa (1965), so they did not introduce a theory 
of technological change. In these models, growth may go on indefinitely because the 
returns to investment in a broad class of capital goods do not necessarily diminish as 
economies develop. 
Research and development theories and the concept of imperfect competition 
began to be incorporated in the growth framework with Romer (1987, 1990) and included 
significant contributions by Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman 
(1991). In models presented by these researchers, technological advance results from 
purposive R&D activity which is rewarded by some form of ex post monopoly power, so 
if there is no tendency for the economy to run out of ideas, the growth rate can remain 
positive in the long run (Barro and Sala-i-Martín, 2004). The R&D theories have been 
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elaborated on in further research. Jones (1998) apply the research program to 
understanding scale effects in the growth process, Acemoglu (2003) analyses whether 
technological progress will be labour or capital augmenting and Aghion et al. (2001, 
2005) assess the role of competition in the growth process.  
2.2.2 Leading paradigms of economic growth 
According to Aghion and Howitt (2009), the primary reference in growth 
economics is the neoclassical paradigm where the growth process is described by:  
• a production equation which expresses the current flow of output goods as a function 
of the current stocks of capital and labour: 
𝑌 = 𝐴 ∙ 𝐾𝛼 ∙ 𝐿1−𝛼 (2.1) 
where 𝐴 is a productivity parameter and where  <  1 so that productions involve 
decreasing returns to capital; 
• a law of motion that shows how capital accumulation depends on investment (equal 
to aggregate savings) and capital depreciation: 
?̇? = 𝑠𝑌 − 𝛿𝐾 (2.2) 
where 𝑠𝑌 denotes aggregate savings and 𝐾 denotes aggregate capital depreciation.  
The neoclassical model implies that in the long run, economic growth does not 
depend on economic conditions; in other words, economic policy cannot affect a long-
run growth rate of a country (Aghion and Howitt, 2009). However, this model was 
considered to be theoretically unsatisfactory as a tool to explore long-run growth 
determinants and unable to explain or rationalise technical progress. (Barro and Sala-i-
Martín, 2004).  
The first version of endogenous growth theory is the AK theory which does not 
differentiate between capital accumulation and technological progress (Aghion and 
Howitt, 2009). They describe the growth process by: 
• an aggregate production function that is linear homogenous in the stock of capital: 
𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾 (2.3) 
where 𝐴 is a positive constant reflecting the level of technology; 
• the economy’s long-run (and short-run) growth rate determined by capital 




= 𝑠𝐴 − 𝛿 
(2.4) 
 12 
which is increasing in the saving rate 𝑠.  
The AK theory applies equally to advanced countries which have already 
accumulated capital and to countries that are behind in the process of capital 
accumulation. Similar to the neoclassical model, the growth process in AK model is 
independent of developments in the rest of the world, yet it can be used for many purposes 
when the distinction between innovation and accumulation is of secondary importance 
(Aghion and Howitt, 2009). 
The second approach to endogenous growth theory consists of “innovation-based” 
models where the role of technology spillovers is emphasized. The leading example here 
is the product-variety model of Romer (1990), in which innovation causes productivity 
growth by creating new varieties of products. The model starts from a Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977) production function: 





where there are 𝑁𝑡  different varieties of intermediate products produced using 𝐾𝑖𝑡 units 
of capital. When the aggregate capital stock 𝐾𝑡 is divided up evenly among the 𝑁𝑡 existing 




According to (2.6), the aggregate productivity parameter of an economy is the degree of 
product variety 𝑁𝑡 and its long-run growth rate per capita output is the product variety 
growth rate. The model is limited by the fact there is only one kind of innovation and 
predictions of no important role for exit and turnover; however, it can be used in the 
contexts where competition and turnovers are not important enough to be considered 
(Aghion and Howitt, 2009).  
The fourth and final paradigm is theory developed in Aghion and Howitt (1992) 
and elaborated in Aghion and Howitt (1997) which grew out of modern industrial 
organisation theory and is commonly referred to as Schumpeterian growth theory. It 
involves Schumpeterian force of creative destruction and focuses on quality-improving 
innovations that render old products obsolete (Aghion and Howitt, 2009). The theory 





where 𝐴𝑖𝑡 is a parameter of productivity attached to the most recent technology used in 
industry 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝐾𝑖𝑡 represents the flow of a unique intermediate product in this sector 
and aggregate output is the sum of the industry-specific outputs 𝑌𝑖𝑡. The first implication 
of the Schumpeterian paradigm is that faster growth generally implies a higher rate of 
firm turnover, because this process of creative destruction generates entry of new 




= 𝜇𝑛(𝛾 − 1) + 𝜇𝑚(𝑎𝑡
−1 − 1) (2.8) 
where 𝐴𝑡 is the economy’s productivity parameter, 𝑛 is frequency of sector leading-edge 
innovations, 
𝑚
 is frequency if implementation innovations/imitations and at is an inverse 
measure of “distance to the frontier”.  
Schumpeterian theory provides a framework in which the growth effects of 
various policies are highly context dependent. In particular, the Schumpeterian apparatus 
is well suited to analyse how a country’s growth performance will vary with its proximity 
to the technological frontier at, to what extent the country will tend to converge to that 
frontier, and what kinds of policy changes are needed to sustain convergence as 
the country approaches the frontier (Aghion and Howitt, 2009). 
2.2.3 Measures of economic growth 
Economic growth is defined as the increase of output in an economy (e. g. a nation, 
a region or a municipality). In this chapter, I introduce two common measures of 
economic growth – gross domestic product and gross value added. 
Gross domestic product (GDP) measures the monetary value of final goods and 
services produced in a country in a time period (e. g. a quarter or a year). To compare 
GDP across countries, the conversion is done through purchasing power parities, which 
control for differences in the price levels of products between countries to allow 
international comparison (OECD, 2010). Changes in the size of economies and the 
general health of an economy are usually measured and compared by changes in the 
volume of GDP where the changes caused by inflation are removed (henceforth “GDP 
growth”). To capture average living standard or economic well-being, the GDP is 
calculated as a ratio to a population of a country (henceforth “GDP per capita”). Callen 
(2020) states that GDP can be viewed in three different ways: 
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• the production approach: GDP as a summary of “value added” at each stage of 
production (value-added are total sales less the value of intermediate input into the 
process of production); 
• the expenditure approach: GDP includes the values of purchases made by final users 
(e. g. consumption of households, investments of companies and purchases by 
governments); 
• the income approach: GDP suns the incomes generated by production (e. g. 
compensation of employees and the operating surplus of companies). 
However, GDP does not include all productive activity, such as unpaid work or black-
market activities, as these are difficult to measure.  
Gross value added (GVA) measures the contribution of each individual producer, 
industry or sector to the economy. In other words, it is the value of goods and services 
that have been produced less the costs of all inputs and raw materials attributable to that 
production. This variable represents the value of labour and capital used in producing 
gross output. GVA can be decomposed into the following components: 
• compensation of employees: wages, salaries and the value of social contributions paid 
by employers; 
• gross operating surplus: the remuneration of the production factor capital; 
• mixed income: the surplus or deficit accruing from production by unincorporated 
enterprises owned by households; 
• other taxes on production less subsidies on production. 
One of its advantages is that it avoids problems inherent in the measurement of growth as 
a gross concept, as it measures the value that a resident unit adds to the values of the 
input-supplying units (OECD, 2010). Compared to GDP, GVA includes the financial 
intermediation services indirectly measured (FISIM) and is measured net of taxes and 
subsidies on products (ECB, 2003). These two aspects cause that when the two economic 
growth measures are compared, there are some empirical discrepancies, making 
employment of both indicators useful in my thesis.  
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2.3 Macroprudential policy: scope, instruments and measurement 
2.3.1 Definition and scope of macroprudential policy 
Macroprudential policy is defined as set of tools used to limit systemic risks to 
the financial sector and includes actions related to the whole sector or its significant parts 
aiming at identification and prevention of the vulnerabilities build-ups in the sector as 
a whole (Cecchetti and Schoenholtz, 2011; ECB, 2017a). According to IMF (2013b), 
systemic risk usually arises through: 
• the tendency of the financial system to amplify adverse aggregate shocks, 
• macro-financial feedback mechanisms resulting in an overexposure to such shocks, 
• linkages within the financial sector that increase its vulnerability to idiosyncratic or 
aggregate shocks. 
Cecchetti and Schoenholtz (2011) state that externalities causing systemic risks 
have two sources: common exposure of intermediaries to frail institutions or to underlying 
risks and pro-cyclicality of the links between financial and economic activity which 
amplifies boom and bust cycles. By mitigating systemic risks, macroprudential measures 
aim to reduce the frequency and severity of financial crises (IMF, FSB and BIS, 2016).  
Macroprudential policy is based on six principles: pre-emptive and counter-
cyclical character, relying on the financial cycle concept, paramount importance of the 
real estate aspect in the financial cycle, macroprudential dimension in stress tests of the 
banking and financial system, complementarity and comparable status to monetary 
policies and encompassing market-based finance institutions or products beyond the 
banking sector (ECB, 2016b). According to Financial Stability Forum (2009), Committee 
on the Global Financial System (2010) and IMF (2013), macroprudential policy pursues 
the following intermediate objectives:  
• increasing financial system resilience to aggregate shocks by building and releasing 
buffers that help maintain the ability of the financial system to function effectively, 
even under adverse conditions;  
• containing the build-up of systemic vulnerabilities over time by reducing procyclical 
feedback between asset prices and credit and containing unsustainable increases in 
leverage, debt stocks, and volatile funding;  
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• controlling structural vulnerabilities within the financial system that arise through 
interlinkages, common exposures, and the critical role of individual intermediaries in 
key markets that can render individual institutions “too-big-to-fail”. 
According to FSB, IMF and BIS (2011), macroprudential policy also interacts 
with other spheres of public policy because: 
• other policies have an impact on systemic risk: e. g. monetary policy can affect risk-
taking incentives1, fiscal policy and public debt levels can be an important source of 
vulnerability for the financial sector; 
• macroprudential policy interventions have macroeconomic effects: e. g. raising 
capital requirements in a credit boom may to some extend dampen aggregate demand 
and therefore influence the macroeconomic policy environment. 
As these interlinkages exist, effective macroprudential frameworks require 
institutional arrangements and governance structures that take national circumstances into 
account and can ensure open and frank dialogue among the policymakers on policy 
choices that aim at impacting on systemic risks, resolving conflicts among policy 
objectives and instruments and mobilising the right tools and instruments to limit 
systemic risk (FSB, IMF and BIS, 2011).  
2.3.2 Macroprudential policy instruments and strategic framework 
According to ESRB (2014), macroprudential policy instruments can be divided 
by their objectives: 
• addressing excessive credit growth and leverage: the countercyclical capital buffer 
(CCyB)2, loan-to-value (LTV), loan-to-income (LTI) and debt service-to-income 
(DSTI) caps, sectoral requirements, macroprudential use of Pillar 2, the systemic risk 
buffer (SRB)3, additional own funds requirements and capital conservation buffer, 
leverage ratio4; 
 
1 The interactions between monetary and macroprudential policies are further analysed in Chapter 2.7.  
2 The countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) is designed to help counter pro-cyclicality in the financial 
system, as capital should be accumulated when cyclical systemic risk is judged to be increasing, creating 
buffers that increase the resilience of the banking sector during periods of stress when losses materialise 
(ESRB, 2020b) 
3 The systemic risk buffer (SyRB) may vary across institutions/sets of institutions and aims to address 
systemic risks of a long-term, non-cyclical nature that are not covered by the CRR (ESRB, 2020e). 
4 The aim of the leverage ratio is to act as a complement and a backstop to risk-based capital requirements, 
as it should counterbalance the build-up of systemic risk by limiting the effects of risk weight compression 
during booms (Brei and Gambacorta, 2014). 
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• addressing excessive maturity mismatch and market illiquidity: net stable 
funding ratio (NSFR)5, liquidity buffer ratios (liquidity coverage ratio6), liquidity 
charges, other stable funding requirements (e. g. loan-to deposit (LTD) limits); 
• addressing direct and indirect exposure concentration: large exposures 
restrictions, capital-based instruments (e. g. sectoral capital requirements, SRB, own 
funds requirements, capital conservation buffer7); 
• addressing misaligned incentives and moral hazard: globally systemically 
important institutions (G-SII) buffer, other systemically important institutions (O-SII) 
buffer, SRB, additional own funds/conservation buffer requirements, additional 
liquidity requirements. 
To use macroprudential instruments, relevant authorities have to develop 
a macroprudential policy strategy, which relates objectives to indicators and instruments. 
The macroprudential policy cycle presented by ESRB (2014) comprises of four stages of 
a macroprudential policy strategy: 
• risk identification and assessment: based on monitoring of the sources of systemic 
risk in a well-defined set of key indicators, macroprudential authorities must assess 
whether there is a possible threat to financial stability and whether macroprudential 
interventions are appropriate; 
• instrument selection and calibration: when selecting macroprudential instruments, 
authorities must reflect the underlying sources of risk and should therefore consider 
economic, legal and cross-border aspects, as the instrument(s) should target the type, 
nature and source of systemic risk, be proportionate to the level of risk, limit arbitrage 
opportunities and negative cross-border spillovers and foster market discipline and 
expectations; 
• policy implementation: a number of cross-cutting issues arise when implementing 
macroprudential policy, including the role of guided discretion (inaction bias), policy 
coordination and communication; 
 
5 The net stable funding ratio (NSFR) aims to promote resilience over a longer time horizon by creating 
incentives for banks to fund their activities with more stable sources of funding on an ongoing basis (FSI, 
2018b) 
6 The liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) is designed to ensure that banks hold a sufficient reserve of high-
quality liquid assets (HQLA) to allow them to survive a period of significant liquidity stress lasting 30 
calendar days (FSI, 2018a). 
7 The capital conservation buffer (CCoB) is a capital buffer of 2.5% of a bank’s total exposures aiming at 
conservation of a bank’s capital that needs to be met with an additional amount of Common Equity Tier 1 
capital (ESRB, 2020a). 
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• policy evaluation: after activation of a macroprudential policy instruments, 
authorities should monitor and evaluate its effects which is also useful for refining 
the other stages of the policy cycle. 
2.3.3 Macroprudential policy measures and evaluation 
On cross-country level, Cerutti et al. (2015) document the use of macroprudential 
policies for 119 countries between 2000 and 2017 based on the IMF’s Global 
Macroprudential Policy Instruments (GMPI) survey. Cerutti et al. (2017) focus on 
changes in the intensity in the usage of several widely used prudential tools, taking into 
account both macroprudential and microprudential objectives and their dataset cover 
64 countries between 2000 and 2014 on a quarterly period8.  
On the EU level, Budnik and Kleibl (2018) introduce a comprehensive dataset on 
policies of macroprudential nature in the banking sector of the 28 member states between 
1995 and 2014. Their Macroprudential Policies Evaluation Database (MaPPED) offers 
a detailed overview of the “life-cycle” of policy instruments which are either genuinely 
macroprudential or are essentially microprudential but likely to have a significant impact 
on the whole banking system. European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) collects 
information on macroprudential measures taken to target systemic risks in the real estate 
sector and those that are not harmonised by the EU law (Kochanska, 2017; ESRB, 2020e-
f). Examples include caps to LTV, DTI and DSTI ratios.  
Buch et al. (2018) discuss how macroprudential policy evaluation can be 
structured to improve public understanding of their effects and how the structured policy 
process can enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the existing macroprudential 
framework in Europe. They argued that both risks associated with uncertainty about 
effectiveness of macroprudential policy instruments (inaction bias and the risk of 
choosing an inappropriate instrument or inadequate calibration) can be mitigated if 
macroprudential policy is embedded in a four-step structured policy process. Such 
process involves defining policy objectives, choosing intermediate objectives and 
appropriate indicators, linking instruments to the indicators through ex-ante evaluation 
studies and analysing the effects of these policies through ex-post evaluation studies.  
 
8 Further elaboration on these macroprudential policy indicators is available in Chapter 3.5.2. 
 19 
For further use in my thesis, I employ the index by Cerutti et al. (2015) to capture 
frequency of macroprudential policy use and the index by Cerutti et al. (2017) to account 
for the effects of implemented policy measures. 
2.4 The role of financial sector in economic growth 
Beck (2015) states that economic theory pointed out different channels and 
mechanisms through which financial system can support economic development: 
• by providing payment services and reducing transaction costs which enable efficient 
exchange of goods and services together with labour specialisation; 
• by pooling savings from many individual savers to help overcoming investment 
indivisibilities and allowing exploitation of scale economies; 
• by economising on screening and monitoring costs, thus increasing overall investment 
and improving allocation of resources; 
• by helping to reduce liquidity risk to enable long-term investments; 
• by helping to diversify cross-sectional and inter-temporal risk.  
In this chapter, I review the existing literature on the relationship between 
financial development and economic growth. First, I discuss the direction of causality in 
the relationship. Second, I provide a timeline of seminal studies of the relationship. Third, 
I review the studies focusing on relationship between financial sector components and 
economic growth. Fourth, I examine the views in literature on impact of financial sector 
structure on growth. Fifth, I include the implications of financial crises. Lastly, 
I summarise existing literature on industry- and firm-level of studies on the finance-
growth relationship. 
2.4.1 Direction of causality in the finance-growth relationship 
An important set of authors in the literature agrees that there is a relation between 
finance and economic growth. However, they disagree about the direction of causality.  
The first group of authors has theoretically and empirically shown that there is 
causal direction from financial development to economic growth. In other words, policies 
moving toward the development of financial systems lead to economic growth. This 
argument is supported by the works of McKinnon (1973), King and Levine (1993), 
Levine et al. (2000), and Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004).  
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The second group argues that the direction is from economic growth to financial 
development. Since the economy is growing, there is an increasing demand for financial 
services that induces an expansion in the financial sector. This view is supported by the 
research conducted by Gurley and Shaw (1967), Goldsmith (1969), and Jung (1986).  
The third group postulates that the causal direction is two-way, so financial 
development and economic growth reinforce each other. Patrick (1966) postulate the 
stage of development hypothesis. At the early stage, causality runs from finance to 
growth, but at later stages causality runs from growth to finance. In the early stage of 
economic development, finance causes growth by inducing real capital formation per 
capita. Later on, the economy is in the growth stage and there will be increasing demand 
for financial services, which induces an expansion in the financial sector as well as the 
real sector, thus it implies causality from growth to finance. Blackburn and Hung (1998) 
establish a positive two-way causal relationship between growth and financial 
development. According to them, private informed agents obtain external financing for 
their projects through incentive-compatible loan contracts enforced through costly 
monitoring activities that lenders may delegate to financial intermediaries. Khan (2001) 
also establish a positive two-way causality between finance and growth. He states that 
when borrowing is limited, producers with access to loans from financial intermediaries 
obtain higher returns, creating an incentive for others to undertake the technology 
necessary to access investment loans, which in turn reduces financing costs and increases 
economic growth. 
2.4.2 Research on studies of finance-growth relationship  
The initial idea to link finance and growth was in two seminal contributions. 
Bagehot (1873) argues that finance played a crucial role by facilitation the capital 
mobilisation for “immense works” during the Industrial Revolution. Schumpeter (1911) 
contends that efficient financial intermediaries spur technological progress by 
reallocating investment funds to those entrepreneurs with the best chances of successfully 
implementing innovative products, a process known as "creative destruction." This can 
be done by economising the costs of acquiring and processing information where better 
financial intermediaries are lower cost information producers with consequent 
ramifications for capital allocation and productivity growth (Aghion and Howitt, 1997).  
Goldsmith (1969) was the first researcher who provided significant empirical 
evidence about the correlation of finance and growth for a cross-section of countries. He 
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asserts that financial intermediation has positive effect on growth due to efficiency and 
the volume of investment, even though he indicates the role of the latter is in his opinion 
less important. Although he constructed a measure of financial development (financial 
interrelations ratio) and defined it as the value of all financial assets over gross national 
product, his theoretical framework was still relatively unsophisticated.  
The second class of growth models focuses on technological innovation in 
invention of new production processes and goods. The works of Romer (1990), Grossman 
and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) present models where the functions 
performed by the financial system affect steady-state growth by altering the technological 
innovation rate.  
King and Levine (1993) find a strong and significant association between used 
proxies of financial development and economic growth and also look at the channels 
explaining the association between financial development and economic growth. In 
addition, their empirical results show that predetermined components of financial 
development indicators significantly predict subsequent values of growth indicators. 
They elaborate on Schumpeterian vision of development by incorporating key roles for 
financial intermediaries, stating that policies altering costliness and efficiency of financial 
intermediation exert a first-order influence on economic growth.   
Alternatively, capital accumulation is considered to be the main factor underlying 
economic growth. In this case, better financial intermediaries influence growth mainly by 
raising domestic savings and attracting foreign capital (King and Levine, 1994). Their 
outcomes are in line with the argument of Kaldor (1960) who state that capital 
accumulation is a feature and not a fundamental cause of economic growth. King and 
Levine (1994) found out there is a little support for the view that capital fundamentalism 
should guide the agenda for research and policy advices, as: 
• differences in capital per capita explain few of the differences in output per capita 
across countries; 
• growth in capital stocks accounts for little of output growth across countries; 
• investment to GDP ratio is strongly and robustly associated with economic growth. 
Moreover, it is more reasonable to believe that economic growth causes investments and 
savings (which boost financial development) rather than that investment and savings 
cause economic growth. 
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Beck et al. (2000) find that financial intermediaries exert a large and positive 
impact on total factor productivity growth which contributes to overall GDP growth and 
that the long-run links between financial intermediary development and both physical 
capital growth and private savings rates are tenuous. The results of Bonfiglioli (2007) 
indicate that financial integration has a direct positive effect on productivity, but it does 
not directly affect capital accumulation.  
Loayza and Ranciere (2005) state that over the long run, financial development 
supports and promotes economic growth, as the process of financial development 
involves deepening of markets and services that channel savings to productive investment 
and allow diversification of risk. Furthermore, their outcomes indicate that total impact 
of financial liberalisation and intermediation on economic growth may be a combination 
of conflicting effects of financial depth and fragility (captured by financial volatility and 
crises) and such effects would depend on stage of financial development of a country. 
On the opposite hand, Robinson (1952) argued that financial development follows 
growth, articulating this causality argument by a statement “where enterprise leads 
finance follows”. Furthermore, he considered the possibility of bidirectional causation of 
the finance and growth link. According to this view, economic growth creates demands 
for specific types of financial arrangements and the financial system responds 
automatically to these demands (ECB, 2001).  
Lucas (1988) dismisses finance as an over-stressed determinant of economic 
growth. Miller (1998) states that the contribution of financial markets to financial growth 
is so obvious it does not even warrant discussion. Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2015) study 
the real effects of financial sector growth and find out that the growth of a country’s 
financial system in a drag on productivity growth. To rephrase it, financial booms are not 
enhancing growth in general, likely because the financial sector competes with the rest of 
the economy for resources. Arcand et al. (2015) examine whether there is a threshold 
above which financial depth no longer has a positive effect on economic growth and 
conclude that financial depth starts having a negative effect on growth when the credit to 
the private sector exceeds 100 % of GDP.  
2.4.3 Impact of financial sector components on economic growth 
Boyd and Prescott (1986) conclude that banks play a key role in reducing 
information loss, leading to more efficient resource allocation, while other studies 
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propose that the financial sector underperform in terms of finance allocation compared to 
the banking sector (Bhide, 1993; Stiglitz, 1985). Another group of studies stresses that 
stock markets overcome banks in promoting economic growth. These theories emphasize 
that the financial sector is not only free from the monopolistic and conservative 
environment that the banking sector impose to the economy but also encourages 
innovation and competition stimulating growth in more effective ways (Georgantopoulos 
et al., 2015).  
Levine and Zervos (1998) employ stock market capitalisation and stock market 
turnover to study the association between equity market properties and economic growth 
and they study how capital accumulation and productivity growth are affected by stock 
market development. Their results suggest that stock market liquidity has independent 
positive effects on economic growth and they also find the beginning-of-period levels of 
stock market liquidity are positively and significantly correlated with subsequent rates of 
physical capital accumulation and productivity growth. Furthermore, the data fail to reject 
the hypothesis that stock market size is not robustly correlated with growth, suggesting 
that stock trading ability fosters investment, resource reallocation and ultimately growth 
rather than ability to list it. 
Levine et al. (2000) find out that exogenous components of development of 
financial intermediaries (e. g. private credit on growth and liquid liabilities) are positively 
associated with economic growth and that differences among countries in legal and 
accounting systems help account for differences in the development. Their findings 
indicate that legal and accounting reforms aimed at improving and strengthening creditor 
rights, contract enforcement and accounting practices can support financial development 
and contribute to faster economic growth. Cole et al. (2008) find a positive and significant 
relationship between bank stock returns and future GDP growth independent of the 
previously documented relationship between market index returns and economic growth. 
According to Shen and Lee (2006), stock market development has positive effects 
on growth while banking development has an unfavourable, if not negative, effect on 
growth. In their empirical results, conditional variables of middle-income level and 
continental dummies strengthen the positive impact of stock market development on 
growth, whereas the conditional variables of financial liberalisation mitigate such positive 
impacts. Furthermore, financial development and growth may be in a nonlinear form, as 
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relationship between growth and bank development is better described as a weak inverse 
U-shape when additional stock market variables are squared. 
Results of Bittencourt (2012) confirm the Schumpeterian prediction, suggesting 
that finance authorises the entrepreneurs to invest in productive activities which promote 
economic growth. He highlights importance of a more open, competitive and therefore 
active financial sector in channelling financial resources to entrepreneurs, the relevance 
of macroeconomic stability (in terms of low inflation rates) and the institutional 
framework (central bank independence and fiscal responsibility laws) and structural 
reforms as key pre-conditions for financial development resulting in sustainable growth. 
Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2015) find that credit booms harm more R&D-intensive growth 
engines, so there is a pressing need to reassess the relationship between finance and real 
growth in modern economic systems.  
2.4.4 Impact of financial sector structure on economic growth 
In a cross-country context which is used in this thesis, there is no general rule that 
bank-based9 or market-based10 financial systems are better at promoting economic 
growth. Levine (2002) finds that after controlling for the overall level of financial 
development, information on financial structure does not help in explaining cross-country 
differences in financial development. However, Tadesse (2002) argues that while market-
based systems outperform bank-based systems among countries with developed financial 
sectors, bank-based systems are far better among countries with underdeveloped financial 
sectors. 
Using industry-level data, research finds that financially dependent industries do 
not expand at higher rates in bank-based or market-based financial systems. Beck and 
Levine (2002) confirm that greater financial development accelerates the growth of 
financially dependent industries. Financial structure per se, however, does not help 
explain the differential growth rates of financially dependent industries across countries. 
Access of firms to external finance is not easier, and firms do not grow faster in 
either market-based or bank-based financial systems. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
 
9 In bank-based systems, banks play a leading role in mobilisation of savings, allocation of capital, oversight 
of investment decisions of corporate managers and provision of risk management vehicles (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine, 1999). 
10 In market-based systems, securities markets share central position with banks in getting savings of the 
society to firms, exerting corporate control and easing risk management (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 
1999). 
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(2002) extend their earlier study and show that overall financial development helps ex- 
plain the excess growth of firms across countries, i.e., the proportion of firms that grow 
at rates exceeding the rate at which each firm can grow with only retained earnings and 
short-term borrowing is positively associated with overall financial development. 
However, the degree to which countries are bank-based or market-based does not help 
explain excess growth. 
Carlin and Mayer (2003) examine the relationship between the structure of the 
financial system and types of activities conducted in different countries. They find 
a positive association between information disclosure (as measured by the effectiveness 
of the accounting system), the fragmentation of the banking system (as measured by low 
bank concentration), and the growth of equity-financed and skill-intensive industries. 
Their outcomes are consistent with models by Allen and Gale (1999) and Boyd and Smith 
(1998) which conclude that high technology firms require financial systems that allow 
for diverse views, such as equity markets rather than banks which provided more 
standardized monitoring. This result is also consistent with models by Dewatripont and 
Maskin (1995) that focus on renegotiations where fragmented banking systems tend to 
impose short-term, tighter budget constraints. 
The above presented outcomes do not necessarily imply that institutional 
framework is unimportant for growth. Rather, they may imply that there is not one 
optimal structure for providing growth-enhancing financial functions to the economy 
(Merton and Bodie, 2004). In addition, the growth-maximizing mixture of markets and 
intermediaries may depend on legal, regulatory, political, and other factors that have not 
been adequately incorporated into current theoretical or empirical research. In research, 
aggregate cross-country indicators of the degree to which countries are bank-based or 
market-based are used and these indicators may not sufficiently capture the comparative 
roles of banks and markets and may not be sufficiently country-specific to gauge 
accurately national financial structure (Levine, 2005). 
2.4.5 Implications of financial crises for economic growth 
Financial crisis is a disturbance to financial markets which spreads through 
the financial sector and results in disrupting the market’s capacity for capital allocation 
(Eichengreen and Portes, 1987). Claessens and Kose (2013) identified four common 
features of such crisis: 
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• increases in asset price that turned out to be unsustainable, 
• credit booms leading to excessive debt burdens, 
• build-up of marginal loans and systemic risk, 
• failure of regulation and supervision to keep up with financial development and get 
ahead of the crisis when it erupted. 
Furthermore, they added four key new aspects related to the recent global financial crisis: 
• widespread use of complex and opaque financial instruments, 
• increased interconnectedness among financial markets, both nationally and 
internationally, 
• high degree of leverage of financial institutions, 
• central role of the household sector. 
Financial crisis can impact potential output through direct and indirect channels. Direct 
effects are observable within all elements of the production function: 
• lowering incentives to invest in capital by decreasing demand for products and raising 
uncertainty on investment returns and risk premia (Pindyck, 1991; Pindyck and 
Solimano, 1993), 
• weakening the labour market situation which can result in increase in the structural 
unemployment rate (Ball, 2009), 
• two competing effects on labour force participation – additional worker effect 
(Debelle and Vickery, 1998) and discouraged worker effect (Elmeskov and 
Pichelmann, 1993), 
• uncertain effect on total factor productivity (Furceri and Mourougane, 2009). 
On the other hand, financial crisis can influence potential output through indirect effects 
which include: 
• policy responses from public authorities to cushion the economic downturn (Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2008), 
• temporary fiscal measures that can lead to permanent increase in government size and 
in debt levels, thus negatively affecting growth (Afonso and Furceri, 2008), 
• fostering implementation of structural reforms that can enhance potential output (Høj 
et al., 2006). 
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Cerra and Saxena (2008) analyse the impact of both financial and political shocks 
on output in a broad set of countries in an autoregressive panel model where financial 
shocks include currency, banking and twin financial crises. Their results indicate that 
the impact of a currency crisis on GDP growth is negative and highly persistent and that 
the depth of the loss varies by income group (there is a modest impact on high-income 
countries). The impact of a banking crisis is nearly twice as large as a currency crisis and 
lead to severe output loss in high-income countries. Output loss from twin financial crises 
is deeper in either of the individual crises while the persistence of the loss is robust to all 
regional and income groups except for the Latin America subset. 
Abiad et al. (2009) use a sample of 88 banking crises from a wide range of 
countries to find out that on average, output does not rebound to its pre-crisis trend path, 
but remains permanently below it, since there are observable reductions of roughly equal 
proportions in the employment rate, the capital-to-labour ratio and total factor 
productivity. Their findings indicate a large variation across analysed countries, as 
medium-run output losses are robustly correlated with the change in output in the first 
year of the crisis, the occurrence of a joint banking-and-currency crisis and high pre-crisis 
level of investment. In addition, their results are consistent with the notion that policies 
implemented in the aftermath of a crisis can help to mitigate the impact on output. 
Furceri and Mourougane (2009) follow the methodology of Cerra and Saxena 
(2008) and found out that financial crises have a negative and persistent effect on potential 
output and that the magnitude of the effect increases with the severity of the crisis. 
However, their results are limited to estimate an average impact and do not allow 
the analysis to differentiate the impact by country, nor to interact crisis effects with 
structural policy indicators.  
Ball (2014) estimate the long-term effect of the 2008-2009 global recession on 
output in 23 countries by comparing current estimates of potential output from the OECD 
and IMF to the path the potential was following in 2007 according to estimates at the time. 
He found out that loss in potential output varies greatly across the sample of countries 
(from almost nothing in Switzerland and Australia to over 30% of potential output in 
Greece, Hungary and Ireland). Furthermore, his results indicate that in most countries, 
the loss of potential output is almost as large as the shortfall of actual output from its pre-
crisis trend which implies that hysteresis effect have been very strong during the crisis. 
Moreover, in the countries which were affected the most, the growth rate of potential 
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output is significantly lower in 2014 than it was before 2008, which in Ball’s opinion 
means that the level of potential output is likely to fall even farther below its pre-crisis 
trends in the following years.  
2.4.6 Industry level studies of finance and growth 
In the first influential study of the industry level, Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue 
that better-developed financial intermediaries and markets help overcome market 
frictions which drive a wedge between the price of external and internal finance. In their 
opinion, industries that are naturally heavy users of external finance should benefit 
disproportionately more from greater financial development than industries that are not 
naturally heavy users of external finance. Their outcomes received critique from Fisman 
and Love (2003), who state that used methodology does not test the extent to which 
financial systems foster the growth of industries with an inherent financial dependence. 
However, Beck and Levine (2002) confirm their findings by using alternative measures 
of financial development. 
Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) examine the role of banking sector concentration 
on firm access to capital by using the methodology of Rayan and Zingales. They found 
out that bank concentration promotes the growth of industries that are naturally heavy 
users of external finance, but bank concentration has a depressing effect on overall 
economic growth. Claessens and Laeven (2005) disagree with such outcomes, noting that 
market concentration is not necessarily a good measure of industry competitiveness. They 
then show that naturally heavy users of external finance grow faster in countries with 
more competitive banking system, while they find no evidence that banking industry 
concentration explains industrial sector growth.  
Claessens and Laeven (2002) build on the study of Rayan and Zingales (1998), as 
they examine the joint impact of financial sector development and the quality of property 
rights protection on the access of firms to external finance and the allocation of resources. 
Their results show that financial sector development hurts growth by hindering the access 
of firms to external finance and insecure property rights hurts growth by leading to 
a suboptimal allocation of resources by distorting firms into investing excessively in 
tangible assets. Thus, even when controlling for property rights protection, financial 
development continues to influence economic growth. However, their conclusions are 
different from the study of post-communist countries presented by Johnson et al. (2002), 
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who find that property rights dominate access to external finance in explaining the degree 
to which firms reinvest their profits.  
Beck et al. (2004) extend the approach of Rayan and Zingales and highlight 
another channel which connects finance and growth – removing impediments to small 
firms. Their results indicate that industries naturally composed of small firms grow faster 
in financially developed economies. These results are consistent with the view that small 
firms face greater informational and contracting barriers to raising funds than large firms, 
so that financial development is particularly important for the growth of industries that, 
for technological reasons, are naturally composed of small firms. 
Wurgler (2000) computes an investment elasticity that gauges the extent to which 
a country increases investment in growing industries and decreases investment in 
declining ones. This is an important contribution because it directly measures the degree 
to which each country’s financial system reallocates the flow of credit. He shows that 
countries with higher levels of financial development both increase investment more in 
growing industries and decrease investment more in declining industries than financial 
underdeveloped economies. 
2.4.7 Firm level studies of finance and growth 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) examine whether financial development 
influences the degree to which firms are constrained from investing in profitable growth 
opportunities. By analysing accounting data for the largest publicly traded manufacturers 
in 26 countries, they find that both banking system development and stock market 
liquidity are positively associated with the excess growth of firms. Beck et al. (2001) 
confirm their findings by using an extended sample of data.  
Love (2003) finds that the sensitivity of investment to internal funds is greater in 
countries with more poorly developed financial system. In his findings, consistent with 
those of Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and Rayan and Zingales (1998), he 
implies that greater financial development reduces the link between the availability of 
internal funds and investment as well as that financial development is particularly 
effective at easing the constraints of small firms.  
Besides analysis at the industry level, Beck et al. (2004) investigate the effect of 
financial development on easing the obstacles that firms face to grow faster. They show 
that financial development weakens the impact of various barriers to firm growth and that 
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small firms benefit the most from financial development. On the other hand, Kumar et al. 
(1999) show that financial development is associated with larger firms, suggesting that 
low levels of financial development constraint firm growth. 
Dyck and Zingales (2004) provide additional firm-level evidence on the 
mechanisms through which financial development influences growth by examining 
whether financial development influences the private benefits of controlling a firm. If 
there are large private benefits of control, this implies that insiders can exploit their 
positions and help themselves at the expense of the firm. The resultant loss of corporate 
efficiency could have aggregate growth effects. They find that the benefits of control are 
greater in countries with poorly developed financial systems. While not linked with 
aggregate growth, this suggests that financial development improves the corporate 
governance of firms. 
2.5 Financial development and macroprudential policy 
Blanchi et al. (2012) develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework 
in which the interaction between financial innovation, credit frictions and imperfect 
innovation is the core of the financial transmission mechanism to study the effects of 
macroprudential policy. Their results show that the effectiveness of macroprudential 
policy depends on the government's information set, the tightness of credit constraints 
and the pace at which optimism surges in the early stages of financial innovation. In their 
opinion, macroprudential policy is least effective when the government is as uninformed 
as private agents, credit constraints are tight, and optimism builds quickly. 
Agénor et al. (2018) study the effects of prudential regulation, financial 
development, and financial openness on economic growth. According to their analytical 
review, prudential regulation can affect growth through a variety of channels, beyond the 
risk-taking effects typically emphasized in the literature. Moreover, these channels can 
impact growth in conflicting ways, implying that theoretically the net effect of prudential 
regulation is ambiguous. Their empirical results from a panel regression show that growth 
may be promoted by prudential policies whose goal is to mitigate financial risks to 
the economy. Such policies should be aimed at promoting financial development and 
financial integration and coordinated across countries, as setting structural prudential 
rules may help to promote growth. At the same time, financial openness tends to reduce 
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the growth benefits of these policies, possibly because of either more opportunities to 
borrow abroad or increased scope for cross-border leakages in regulation.  
Bernier and Plouffe (2019) use research and development (R&D) spending in 
the financial sector to assess the relationship between financial innovation and economic 
growth and evaluate the influence of macroprudential policy on such relationship. Their 
results indicate a net-positive relationship between financial innovation and gross capital 
formation and no evidence of a net-negative impact of financial innovation on growth, 
thus challenging the popular and political stigma which surrounds financial innovation 
and little robust evidence of macroprudential policy influencing the relationship between 
innovation in the financial sector and economic growth. However, while macroprudential 
policy itself may be positively related to economic growth, its interactive effect is to 
reduce any potential influence of financial innovation. 
2.6 Macroprudential policy and economic growth 
Agénor (2016) studies growth and welfare effects of macroprudential regulation 
in an overlapping generations model of endogenous growth with banking and agency 
costs. First, it was shown that the direct effect on investment and economic growth of 
higher reserve requirements, aimed at improving incentives for depositors or mitigating 
systemic financial risks by reducing private sector leverage, may be negative when 
monitoring intensity is taken as given. However, the same policy has conflicting effects 
on growth when monitoring intensity is endogenized because it also affects banks’ 
incentives to monitor. The trade-off between promoting financial stability and fostering 
economic growth can therefore be internalized by setting the required reserve ratio at its 
optimal value. 
Sánchez and Röhn (2016) find out that countries with more effective prudential 
banking supervision experience less severe negative shocks and that the use of several 
macroprudential policies is associated with less extreme positive growth shocks. Their 
results are consistent with the fact that macroprudential policies are mainly ex-ante and 
meant to reduce the boom phase of the economic cycle (Cerutti et al., 2015). However, 
during normal times there appears to be cost involved in their use, as the average growth 
is reduced.  
Boar et al. (2017) investigate the link between macroprudential policies and 
economic performance measured by output volatility and growth over a five-year period. 
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Their results indicate that the more a country uses macroprudential policies, the higher is 
the growth rate of its per capita GDP and the less volatile its GDP growth. Moreover, 
the beneficial effects of macroprudential policies on output growth and volatility are 
found to depend on the degree of economy openness and financial development. For 
economies that are either very open or very financially developed (but not both), 
macroprudential policies tend to be less effective. On the other hand, with a sufficiently 
high degree of development and openness, macroprudential measures gain in 
effectiveness. 
Neanidis (2019) explores whether banking regulation mitigates the adverse effects 
of capital flows volatility on economic growth. The results indicate that banking 
supervision contributes to the growth by diminishing the negative impact of volatile 
capital flows. The findings are valid for both aggregate capital flows and its various 
components, and its net and gross counterparts and they are also robust for various 
measures capturing regulatory policies. The results support the argument that regulatory 
policy focusing on banks which is designed to ensure financial stability is a positive 
contributor to long-run economic growth. 
2.7 Macroprudential policy and other public policies 
As mentioned in Chapter 2.2.1, macroprudential policy closely interacts with 
other spheres of public policy. Macroprudential and monetary policy both target 
macroeconomic stability and affect real economic variables and this interaction depends 
on whether financial imbalances play a role in the monetary policy framework (Galati 
and Moessner, 2011). Fiscal policy and public debt levels can be an important source of 
vulnerability for the financial sector (FSB, IMF and BIS, 2011).  
Borio and Drehmann (2009) support the use of monetary policy to address 
financial imbalances. They also stress that relying only on macroprudential policy to 
address (the time dimension of) financial instability would burden it too much. Angelini 
et al. (2012) use a dynamic general equilibrium model to assess the interaction between 
macroprudential policy and monetary policy. Their results indicate that when economic 
fluctuations are driven by supply shocks, the use of counter-cyclical capital requirements 
has limited effects on macroeconomic stability. The lack of cooperation between the 
macro-prudential authority and the central bank may increase the volatility of the policy 
instruments. This conflict is due to the coexistence of independent authorities, whose 
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policies influence closely related variables but have different objectives. When the 
economy is, instead, hit by financial shocks, macro-prudential policy is effective in 
stabilizing the economy.  
Aikman et al. (2019) describe how interest rates and macroprudential policy – as 
captured by the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) – interact in response to different 
shocks. They find that deploying the CCyB improves outcomes significantly relative to 
when monetary policy is the only tool – this reinforces the rationale for having expanded 
central-bank toolkits to include this policy lever. But despite its powerful role, the CCyB 
should be used less aggressively when monetary policy is constrained at the effective 
lower bound. 
Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2019) propose a stylized general equilibrium model 
to assess the effects of monetary and macroprudential policies on the risk-taking 
incentives of financial intermediaries. Their results show that the optimal combination of 
both policies is closer in terms of both financial stability and social welfare to the optimal 
stand-alone macroprudential policy than to the optimal stand-alone monetary policy and 
thus support the view that macroprudential policy should be the primary tool for 
addressing risks to financial stability. 
2.8 Summary of the chapter 
This chapter provides an overview of analysed phenomena in terms of their 
definition, scope, objectives and measures. Financial development includes factors, 
policies, and institutions that lead to effective financial intermediation and markets, as 
well as deep and broad access to capital and financial services (WEF, 2012). It can be 
measured by single indicators (proxies) and complex indices containing multiple 
indicators. Economic growth mainly determines the material well-being of billions of 
people and its modelling is a topic for theoretical and empirical research (Aghion and 
Howitt, 2009).  Macroprudential policy contributes to the safeguarding of the stability of 
the financial system as a whole (ESRB, 2014). The use of macroprudential policy 
instruments in the European Union can be documented in cross-country datasets 
combined with national reports to the ESRB.  
The relationship between financial development and economic growth has been 
widely discussed among researchers. Theoretical and empirical studies on cross-country, 
country, industry and firm levels focus on the direction of causality in the relationship, 
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whether the link between finance and growth exists, how components and structure of the 
financial sector impact economic growth and impacts of financial crises. For this thesis, 
the most relevant study on the finance-growth is from King and Levine (1993) as it both 
explores and explains association between these phenomena.  
In review of studies focusing on interactions between financial development and 
macroprudential policy, I found out the paper written by Agénor et al. (2018) as the most 
relevant to this thesis. In the paper, effects of prudential regulation, financial development 
and financial openness on economic growth are analysed and the results show that while 
economic growth may be promoted by prudential policies, financial openness reduces 
such growth benefits.  
Among the existing literature on relationship between macroprudential policy and 
economic growth, the most relevant study is from Boar et al. (2017). The study focuses 
on the link between macroprudential policies and economic performance and adds 
financial development and openness as factors which influence effectiveness of 
macroprudential measures.  
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3 Data and stylised facts of analysed countries 
I have decided to narrow the scope of my analysis to twelve European Union 
member states which adopted euro as their single currency in the period from 1999 to 
2001. These are Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), 
Greece (EL), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT) 
and Spain (ES).  
I have chosen this panel of countries, because they have similar legal basis of 
macroprudential policy (see Chapter 3.2) and since 1999 (2001 for Greece), they have 
followed a single monetary policy (see Chapter 3.3). I omitted countries that adopted euro 
at a later stage (Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia), 
because they did not join the euro area at once and this would be an issue in the empirical 
analysis. 
3.1 Financial and banking sectors in the analysed countries 
This chapter analyses financial and banking sector in each country in the panel. 
I use data from national central banks, IMF and European Banking Federation to get an 
overview of role of financial sector in the countries.  
In Austria, the banking sector is highly developed and there are nearly 600 banks 
(Sützl, 2019). It can be divided into several sectors, the biggest ones are the joint stock 
banks, the Raiffeisen sector and the saving banks (Sützl, 2019). The joint stock banks, 
including the central institutions of the cooperative groups and savings banks, have 
Austrian as well as foreign shareholders, because the banks focus on Central Eastern and 
South Eastern Europe market as well. Prudent and timely supervisory measures have 
contributed to the fact that foreign currency loans no longer pose a systemic risk for 
the Austrian banking sector (OeNB, 2020a). 
The Belgian banking community is characterised by a variety of players who are 
active in different market segments. Like the Belgian economy, the banking sector is 
characterised by a high degree of international openness. Of the 87 banks established in 
Belgium at the end of September 2018, 84% were branches or subsidiaries of foreign 
institutions, and only 16% had Belgian majority ownership (De Vos, 2019). Cross-border 
financial linkages, while still significant, have declined and Brussels remains the home 
of globally significant financial market infrastructures and service providers (IMF, 2018).  
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Finland’s financial system is relatively large with credit institutions constituting 
the largest share and there are significant links between some banks and non-bank 
financial firms (IMF, 2016a). The Finnish banking market is dominated by four major 
banks, which together, hold 81% of the market shares (Somerla, 2019). The banking 
system is highly concentrated and foreign banks play a major role – two foreign-owned 
banks account for 70% of banks’ assets (IMF, 2016a). The concentrated and relatively 
large non-bank financial sector (it accounts for nearly 40 % of the financial system) plays 
an important role in managing savings and diversifying portfolios (IMF, 2016a).  
The French banking sector numbers 340 banks, from which four are among the 
euro area Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) (Waxin, 2019). French banks 
finance business development as well as French consumers, as credit is one of the main 
growth drivers in the country. There is also a global systemically important insurer (G-
SII) and a large global reinsurer (IMF, 2019b). The share of non-bank financial 
intermediaries is around 40 % and the insurance sector is one of the largest in the EU with 
more than 700 firms (IMF, 2019b). 
In Germany, the financial system is dominated by banks (they account for two 
thirds of the financial sector) and is generally domestically oriented and robust to shocks 
(IMF, 2016b). The banking system comprises three pillars — private commercial banks, 
public-sector banks, and cooperative banks — distinguished by the legal form and 
ownership structure and has gone through a sustained period of consolidation 
(Brüggemann, 2019). Bank funding, in aggregate, is more reliant on deposits compared 
to other advanced economies (IMF, 2016b). Financial infrastructures are fewer than in 
other financial centres but are interconnected with G-SIBs. 
The financial system of Greece is dominated by banks and is slowly progressing 
towards a new chapter after years of financial assistance programmes. The banking sector 
consists of 15 domestic credit institutions (the four largest control about 96 % of the 
banking assets) and 20 foreign banks (Vasila, 2019). Other financial intermediaries 
represent only a small part of the financial sector, so their impact on financial stability is 
smaller (Bank of Greece, 2017).  
The Irish financial system has strengthened significantly since the crisis and 
undergone major structural changes (IMF, 2016c). At the end of 2018, there were 
61 operating banks which included 24 credit institutions authorised in Ireland, 36 
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branches of banks authorised in the EEA and one branch of a non-EEA credit institution 
(O’Brien, 2019). The Irish government has majority stakes in two banking groups (71% 
stake in Allied Irish Banks and 75% in permanent tsb) and a minority stake in the Bank 
of Ireland (O’Brien, 2019). 
The banking sector belongs to the strong points of the Italian economy. Banks 
account for almost 85 percent of total financial sector assets (IMF, 2013a). The 
restructuring and the consolidation of the Italian banking sector continue and is partly 
induced by the changing regulatory environment and the digital revolution. As of 2019, 
there were 113 bank holding groups and independent banks (Amici, 2019).  
Luxembourg has a long-standing expertise in financial services and the banking 
sector is the main economic engine (Verony, 2019). The Luxembourg financial system 
has expanded significantly in recent decades to play a key role in the intermediation of 
global capital (IMF, 2017d). Luxembourg features the highest banking 
internationalisation rate in Europe (94.8%) with more than one third of the 136 banks 
coming from outside the European Union (Verony, 2019). 
In the Netherlands, the financial system is large and globally interconnected (van 
Kempen, 2019). The country is home to a G-SIB and a G-SII. The banking system 
comprises half of the financial sector and is concentrated in four domestic banks (IMF, 
2017a). The pension system is ranked first globally by share of GDP and the insurance 
sector has consolidated assets amounting to about 140 percent of GDP (IMF, 2017a). 
The Portuguese banking sector comprises 152 credit institutions, 62 of which 
were banks (including 30 branches of foreign banks), 86 mutual agricultural credit banks 
and four savings banks (APB, 2019). It has undergone a very intense transformational 
process which resulted in significant achievements on all fronts: solvency, liquidity, asset 
quality and, more recently, profitability, as well as business model adjustments and 
governance improvements (Martinho, 2019).  
Spanish financial landscape is dominated by the banking system; the rest of 
the financial system includes insurers, pension and investment funds, and financial 
vehicle corporations, most of which are part of bank-led conglomerates (IMF, 2017e). It 
has twelve banking groups, representing more than 90% of the industry, with 52 private 
banks, two saving banks and 62 cooperative banks (Rizo, 2019). Spain is also s home to 
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a G-SIB. At a stable 25 percent of GDP, shadow banking is small when compared with 
other major euro area countries (IMF, 2017e). 
3.2 Macroprudential policy in the euro area 
3.2.1 International approach to macroprudential policy 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), committee of the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS), sets the primary global standards for prudential 
regulation of banks and provides a forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisory 
matters for its 45 members (central banks and bank supervisors) from 28 jurisdictions 
(BCBS, 2020). BCBS has established a series of international standards for bank 
regulation, which are commonly known as Basel I, Basel II and Basel III.  
The Basel Capital Accord (henceforth Basel I) was approved in 1988 and called 
for a minimum ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets of 8% to be implemented by the end 
of 1992 in virtually all countries with active international banks (BCBS, 2020). The 
Accord was amended in 1991 to more precisely define the general provisions or general 
loan loss reserves that could be included in the capital adequacy calculation (BCBS, 
1991). Another amendment recognising the effects of bilateral netting of banks' credit 
exposures in derivative products and to expand the matrix of add-on factors was issued 
in 1995 (BCBS, 1995). In 1996, Market Risk Amendment and intentions of Committee 
member on how to recognise effects of multilateral netting were issued (BCBS, 1996; 
BCBS, 2005a). The Market Risk Amendment was designed to incorporate within the 
Accord a capital requirement for the market risks arising from banks' exposures to foreign 
exchange, traded debt securities, equities, commodities and options. 
The revised capital adequacy framework (henceforth Basel II) was issued as 
a proposal in 1999 and released in 2004. According to BCBS (2004), it comprised three 
pillars: 
• minimum capital requirements which develop and expand the rules from Basel I; 
• supervisory review of an institution’s capital adequacy and internal assessment 
process; 
• effective use of disclosure as a lever to strengthen market discipline and encourage 
sound banking practices. 
Basel II was designed to improve the way regulatory capital requirements reflect 
underlying risks and to better address the financial developments and innovations that 
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had occurred in recent years. The changes aimed at elaborating on existing and continued 
improvements in risk measurement and control (BCBS, 2020). In 2005, BCBS published 
a consensus document which governs the treatment of trading books of banks under the 
new framework and both texts were integrated in a comprehensive document in 2006 
(BCBS, 2005b; BCBS, 2020). Demands on greater degree of cooperation between home 
and host supervisors were addressed in guidance on information sharing in 2006 which 
was followed by advice on supervisory cooperation and allocation mechanisms in the 
context of the advanced measurement approaches for operational risk (BCBS, 2020).  
The banking sector entered the global financial crisis with too much leverage and 
inadequate liquidity buffers, so the need for a fundamental strengthening of the Basel II 
framework had become apparent. The dangerous combination of poor governance and 
risk management and inappropriate incentive structures was demonstrated by the 
mispricing of credit and liquidity risks, and excess credit growth (BCBS, 2020). In 2009, 
BCBS issued a package of documents enhancing and strengthening the regulation and 
supervision of internationally active banks in the lights of weaknesses revealed by the 
crisis. In 2010, higher global minimum capital standards for commercial banks were 
announced by the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision, the oversight body of 
BCBS (BCBS, 2010). This followed an agreement to come up with a new capital and 
liquidity reform package. 
The capital and liquidity reform package (henceforth Basel III) was a central 
element of BCBS’s response to the global financial crisis. It contains higher and better-
quality capital, better risk coverage, the introduction of a leverage ratio as a backstop to 
the risk-based requirement, measures to promote the build-up of capital that can be drawn 
down in periods of stress, and the introduction of two global liquidity standards (BCBS, 
2010). The enhanced Basel framework revises and strengthens Basel II pillars and is 
extended to more areas. The reforms include: 
• stricter requirements for quality and quantity of regulatory capital and reinforcement 
of the central role of common equity; 
• an additional layer of common equity (the capital conservation buffer) that restricts 
pay-outs to help meet the minimum common equity requirement when breached; 
• a countercyclical capital buffer which places restrictions on participation by banks in 
system-wide credit booms with the aim of reducing their losses in credit busts; 
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• a leverage ratio which is a minimum amount of loss-absorbing capital relative to all 
of a bank's assets and off-balance sheet exposures regardless of risk weighting; 
• liquidity requirements (minimum liquidity ratio, liquidity coverage ratio) intended to 
provide enough cash to cover funding needs over a 30-day period of stress; and 
a  longer-term ratio, the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), intended to address 
maturity mismatches over the entire balance sheet; 
• additional requirements for systemically important banks, including additional loss 
absorbency and strengthened arrangements for cross-border supervision and 
resolution (BCBS, 2010). 
BCBS completed the Basel III post-crisis reforms in 2017 and published new 
standards for the calculation of capital requirements for credit risk, credit valuation 
adjustment risk and operational risk. The final reforms also include a revised leverage 
ratio, a leverage ratio buffer for global systemically important banks and an output floor, 
based on the revised standardised approaches, which limits the extent to which banks can 
use internal models to reduce risk-based capital requirements (BCBS, 2017). These final 
reforms address the weak points of the pre-crisis regulatory framework and provide 
a regulatory framework for a resilient banking system that supports the real economy. 
Moreover, the revisions of Basel III framework help to restore credibility in the 
calculations of risk-weighted assets (RWA) by enhancing the robustness and risk 
sensitivity of the standardised approaches for credit risk and operational risk, constraining 
internally modelled approaches and complementing the risk-based framework with 
a revised leverage ratio and output floor (BCBS, 2020). 
3.2.2 Institutional framework of macroprudential policy at the EU level 
Before the adoption of Basel III, the High-Level Group on financial supervision 
in the EU chaired by Jacques de Larosière (the de Larosière Group) called for a coherent 
and workable regulatory framework of financial regulations, supervisory powers and 
sanctioning regimes (de Larosière et al., 2009). The report suggested that harmonised set 
of core rules and the European framework for macroprudential supervision should be 
created. Harmonised set of rules contributes to a well-functioning regulatory framework 
and together with rules for macroprudential supervision, they ensure financial stability.  
One of the outcomes of the de Larosière report was establishment of 
the European Systemic Risk Board, which is responsible for the macroprudential 
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oversight of the EU financial system and the prevention and mitigation of systemic risk 
(ESRB, 2020c). ESRB monitors and assesses systemic risk in normal times for the 
purpose of mitigating the exposure of the system to the risk of failure of systemic 
components and enhancing the financial system’s resilience to shocks (Regulation (EU) 
No 1092/2010). In that respect, the ESRB contributes to ensuring financial stability and 
mitigating the negative impacts on the internal market and the real economy.  
The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) Regulation assigns macroprudential 
responsibilities to both national authorities11 and the ECB (Council Regulation (EU) 
No 1024/2013). In particular, the Regulation gives national authorities the power to 
implement macroprudential measures and gives the ECB the power to tighten the 
measures set out in EU legislation. The ECB can also lead the analysis of cross-border 
effects and can support action being taken to promote reciprocation of national 
macroprudential policies (ECB, 2016a). The ECB and the national authorities engage in 
broad discussions on the use of macroprudential instruments in the SSM, both at technical 
and policy level. National authorities are required to notify the ESRB of their 
macroprudential measures in accordance with the CRD IV, the CRR and various ESRB 
recommendations. 
The ECB’s ultimate decision-making body, the Governing Council, is responsible 
for macroprudential policy decisions (ECB/2014/1). The Governing Council works 
closely with the Supervisory Board on macroprudential matters and benefits from 
the Supervisory Board’s knowledge of the banking system. The Macroprudential Forum, 
composed of the members of the Governing Council and the Supervisory Board, operates 
as a platform for regular discussion at the highest level, bringing together the micro- and 
the macroprudential perspectives across the SSM (ECB, 2019a). The Financial Stability 
Committee is the European System of Central Banks’ main technical committee 
supporting the ECB in the area of macroprudential policy and includes high-level 
representatives from the national central banks and supervisory authorities of the SSM 
Member States (ESRB, 2014). They meet to discuss macroprudential measures and 
advise the Governing Council on macroprudential concerns and potential policy 
responses, including the preparation of draft proposals on the use of macroprudential tools 
for the banking sector. 
 
11 Further description of national institutional frameworks in macroprudential policy is included in Chapter 
3.2.4.  
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The coexistence of three layers of decision-making regarding macro-prudential 
risk – the ESRB, the ECB’s Governing Council and the national authorities – makes for 
a complex institutional framework. Cooperation between these bodies is essential and in 
particular, it is very important for the ECB and the ESRB to agree on procedures to ensure 
information sharing and operational effectiveness (ESRB, 2014). 
3.2.3 Legal framework of macroprudential policy in the euro area 
In the EU law, the rules deriving from the Basel III framework have their legal 
basis in: 
• Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR): Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements 
for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) 
No 648/2012; 
• Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV): Directive 2013/36/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit 
institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, 
amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 
2006/49/EC. 
The CRD IV governs the access to deposit-taking activities while the CRR establishes he 
prudential requirements institutions need to respect. Member States are required to 
transpose the CRD IV into national law, while the CRR is directly applicable, which 
means that it creates law that takes immediate effect in all Member States in the same 
way as a national instrument, without any further action on the part of the national 
authorities (EC, 2013).  
In addition to the Basel III framework, there are number of important changes to 
the banking regulatory framework in the directive (Directive 2013/36/EU):  
• further strengthening of the remuneration framework: For performance from 
1 January 2014 onwards, the variable component of the total remuneration shall not 
exceed 100% of the fixed component of the total remuneration of material risk takers. 
Exceptionally, and under certain conditions, shareholder can increase this maximum 
ratio to 200%.  
• enhanced governance: CRD IV strengthens the requirements with regard to corporate 
governance arrangements and processes and introduces new rules aimed at increasing 
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the effectiveness of risk oversight by Boards, improving the status of the risk 
management function and ensuring effective monitoring by supervisors of risk 
governance. 
• diversity: CRD IV introduces a number of requirements aiming at diversity in board 
composition which should contribute to effective risk oversight by boards, providing 
for a broader range of views and opinion and therefore avoiding the phenomenon of 
group think. 
• enhanced transparency for regaining the trust of the public in the financial sector: 
CRD IV improves transparency regarding the activities of banks and investment funds 
in different countries, in particular as regards profits, taxes and subsidies in different 
jurisdictions. 
• systemic risk buffer: Each Member State may introduce a Systemic Risk Buffer of 
Common Equity Tier 1 for the financial sector or one or more subsets of the sector, 
in order to prevent and mitigate long term non-cyclical systemic or macro-prudential 
risks with the potential of serious negative consequences to the financial system and 
the real economy in a specific Member State. 
• other systemic institution buffer: In addition to the mandatory G-SII buffer, 
the CRD IV provides for a supervisory option for a buffer on “other” systemically 
important institutions. This includes domestically important institutions as well as EU 
important institutions. 
In the regulation, a single set of harmonised prudential rules is created for the first 
time. This ensures uniform application of Basel III in all Member States which closes 
regulatory loopholes and thus contributes to proper functioning of the Internal Market. 
The new rules remove a large number of national options and discretions and allow the 
Member States to apply stricter requirements only when justified by national 
circumstances (e.g. real estate), needed on financial stability grounds or because of 
a bank's specific risk profile (EC, 2013). 
In 2019, the CRR/CRD IV package was updated. The CRD V (EU Directive 
2019/878) aims to address issues raised in relation to the provisions of CRD IV that 
proved not to be sufficiently clear and have, therefore, been subject to divergent 
interpretations or that have been found to be overly burdensome for certain institutions. 
It also contains adjustments to CRD IV that are necessary following either the adoption 
of other relevant Union legal acts or the changes proposed in parallel to the CRR. Finally, 
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the amendments better align the current regulatory framework to international 
developments to promote consistency and comparability among jurisdictions.  
The Basel III reforms implemented by CRR II (Regulation (EU) 2019/876) and 
CRD V include an overhaul of the market risk regime, new capital rules for derivatives 
and securities financing transactions, a binding leverage ratio and supplemental leverage 
requirement for global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), a net stable funding 
liquidity ratio (NSFR) and rules on total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC) for G-SIBs 
(Council of the EU, 2019). In addition to the Basel III prudential reforms, the measures 
contain a number of further changes including:  
• a new authorisation and supervision regime for financial holding companies;  
• a new requirement for third country banking groups with significant activity in the 
EU to establish an EU intermediate parent undertaking (IPU);  
• amendments to Pillar 2 capital rules;  
• amendments to large exposure rules;  
• new remuneration requirements;  
• proportionality requirements. 
Some provisions of the CRR II (e.g. definitions, provisions on massive disposals, certain 
provisions on own funds requirements for central counterparties and TLAC) apply from 
27 June 2019, when the CRD V/CRR II package entered into force. Member States have 
to transpose the CRD V to their national legislation until 28 December 2020. From this 
date, some CRR II provisions will apply (e.g. provisions on exposures secured by 
mortgages on immovable property). The main application date for CRR II is 28 June 
2021.  
3.2.4 Macroprudential policy frameworks in analysed countries 
A well-defined policy framework is necessary for effective conduct of 
macroprudential policy. Since the responsibility for the adoption of measures necessary 
to maintain financial stability lies first within national frameworks, effectiveness of 
national macroprudential policy frameworks is important (ESRB/2011/3). National 
macroprudential authorities are responsible for identifying, monitoring and assessing 
risks to financial stability and of implementing macroprudential policies (ESRB/2011/3). 
National designated authority is responsible for setting the countercyclical buffer rate for 
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that Member State (Directive 2013/36/EU). According to ESRB (2019), there are two 
approaches to macroprudential policy among the analysed panel of countries: 
• integrated approach: the role of macroprudential authority and the role of designated 
authority are undertaken by the same institution(s); 
• separated approach: the role of macroprudential authority and the role of designated 
authority are undertaken by different institutions.  
Macroprudential authority and designated authority roles are undertaken by 
the same institution in Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal. 
The institutional setups are as follows: 
• Belgium: The National Bank of Belgium (NBB) is in charge of macroprudential 
supervision and also has special powers in relations to systemic institutions (NBB, 
2017). Its macroprudential powers were further extended by the macroprudential law 
and the new Belgian Banking law in 2014, as it designated NBB as 
the macroprudential authority.  
• Finland: The Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority (FIN-FSA) is responsible for 
taking macroprudential policy decisions and also serves as the authority for 
supervision of Finland’s financial and insurance sectors (FIN-FSA, 2020). FIN-FSA 
is independent of the Bank of Finland.  
• France: The High Council for Financial Stability (HCSF) supervises the financial 
system as a whole to ensure its stability and its sustainable contribution to economic 
growth. The council has eight members – the French Minister of the Economy and 
Finance (chair), Governor of the Banque de France, Vice-Chairman of ACPR12, the 
Chairman of AMF13, the Chairman of ANC14 and three external members (IMF, 
2019).  
• Greece: The Bank of Greece exercises macroprudential tasks with a view to 
strengthening the resilience of the financial system and decreasing the build-up of 
systemic risks, conducts prudential supervision and is responsible for setting 
the countercyclical capital buffer rate (Bank of Greece, 2016).  
 
12 ACPR is an abbreviation for the French Prudential Supervisory and Resolution Authority (Autorité de 
contrôle prudentiel et de résolution).  
13 AMF is an abbreviation for the French Financial Markets Authority (Autorité des marchés financiers).  
14 ANC is an abbreviation for the French Accounting Standards Authority (Autorité des normes 
comptables).  
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• Ireland: The Central Bank of Ireland has a wide range of macroprudential powers that 
derive from both European and Irish law, including implementation of 
macroprudential policy instruments and prudential supervision (Central Bank of 
Ireland, 2014).  
• Italy: The Bank of Italy performs its tasks of safeguarding financial stability through 
intense analysis and supervision of the financial system’s single components and of 
the system as a whole, in order to promptly identify vulnerabilities and risks for 
financial stability (Bank of Italy, 2020). The powers to set up a macroprudential 
authority were granted in 2016, but have since expired, leaving the Bank of Italy 
responsible for addressing financial stability concerns (ESRB, 2019).  
• Portugal: Banco de Portugal defines and executes macroprudential policy through 
macroprudential instruments, orders, warnings and recommendations to promote 
the financial system’s resilience in absorbing risks, ensuring adequate levels of 
financial intermediation and thus contributing to sustainable economic growth (Banco 
de Portugal, 2020).  
Macroprudential authority and designated authority are different 
institutions in Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain. The countries 
have following frameworks: 
• Austria: The Financial Market Stability Board (FMSB) is the macroprudential 
authority which addresses risks to financial stability and issues recommendations for 
further actions (FMSB, 2020). The work of FMSB is linked to the Oesterechische 
Nationalbank (OeNB) which is responsible for macroprudential monitoring and to 
the Financial Market Authority (FMA) which is an integrated supervisory authority 
as well as the designed authority (FMA, 2020; OeNB, 2020b). 
• Germany:  The Financial Stability Committee serves as the macroprudential 
authority, as it examines issues relevant to financial stability in Germany, identifies 
potential risks, issues warnings and present recommendations on how to avert 
the risks (Federal Ministry of Finance, 2020). It comprises of representatives of 
the Federal Ministry of Finance (one of them is a chair), Deutsche Bundesbank and 
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). The Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority is a designated authority responsible for supervision in the financial sector 
(ESRB, 2019).   
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• Luxembourg: The Systemic Risk Committee (CdRS) coordinates macroprudential 
policy in Luxembourg. The committee comprises of the Finance Minister, Director 
General of the BCL15, Director General of the CSSF and Director of CAA16 (IMF, 
2017d). The Financial Supervisory Authority (CSSF) is the national designed 
authority responsible for implementing macroprudential supervision and policy for 
Luxembourg banks (CSSF, 2020).  
• Netherlands: The Financial Stability Committee (FSC) is the national 
macroprudential authority whose members include representatives of De 
Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), Ministry of Finance (MoF) and Authority for the 
Financial Markets. The FSC issues warnings and makes recommendations to mitigate 
risks (without a comply-or-explain mechanism), but the use of macroprudential 
instruments remains the responsibility of individual agencies, the DNB and the MoF 
(IMF, 2017b). The DNB conducts macro- and microprudential policies as the 
National Designated and Competent Authority (IMF, 2017b) 
• Spain: The Macroprudential Authority Financial Stability Council (AMCESFI) 
monitors and analyses sources of systemic risk to issue warning, recommendations 
and opinions on matters pertaining to financial stability (BdE, 2020a). AMCESFI 
pursue the objective of financial stability in cooperation with sectoral authorities; 
however, each of the sectoral authorities retains its supervisory competences, 
including the power to adopt macroprudential tools (ECB, 2019c). Banco de España 
serves as national designated authority for the preparation, decision and 
implementation of macroprudential measures applicable to credit institutions (BdE, 
2020b).  
3.3 Monetary policy in the euro area 
The agreement to form a European monetary union was formalised in the Treaty 
of Maastricht, which was signed in 1992 (Cecchetti and Schoenholz, 2011). In 1999, 
the ECB assumed responsibility for monetary policy in the euro area which means that 
a member of the euro area is not able to use domestic interest and exchange rate policies 
as separate policy instruments (ECB, 2011d).  
 
15 BCL is an abbreviation for the Banque Centrale du Luxembourg.  
16 CAA is an abbreviation for Commissariat aux Assurances.  
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3.3.1 Institutional framework of the single monetary policy 
The legal basis for the single monetary policy is laid down in the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU), the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 
Bank (the Statute of the ESCB). The Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, which is 
annexed to the Treaties as a protocol, establish the ECB, the Eurosystem and the ESCB.  
According to Article 13 of the TEU, the European Central Bank (ECB) is an 
institution of the EU. The ECB is responsible for the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions located in the euro area and participating non-euro area Member States within 
the SSM which also comprises the national competent authorities (ECB, 2020l). It thereby 
contributes to the safety and soundness of the banking system and the stability of the 
financial system within the EU and each participating Member State. The main bodies of 
the ECB are: 
• the Executive Board: The Executive Board of the ECB comprises the President, 
the Vice-President and four other members17 who are all appointed by the European 
Council and oversees the operation of the ECB and the Eurosystem (ECB, 2020e). It 
is responsible for preparing the Governing Council meetings, implementing monetary 
policy for the euro area by giving instructions to the central banks in the euro area, 
managing the day-to-day operations of the ECB and exercising powers delegated to 
it by the Governing Council (ECB, 2020e).  
• the Governing Council: The Governing Council is the highest decision-making body 
of the ECB. It is composed of the six Executive Board members and governors of 
the central banks in the euro area18 (Cecchetti and Schoenholz, 2011). The Council is 
responsible for adoption of guidelines and decisions ensuring the well-functioning of 
the ECB and the Eurosystem, formulation of monetary policy (decisions related to 
monetary objectives, key interest rates, the supply of reserves in the Eurosystem) and 
adoption of decisions related to o the general framework under which supervisory 
decisions are taken (ECB, 2020g).  
 
17 All Executive Board members are appointed for an eight-year term that cannot be renewed. Currently, 
the members of the Executive Board are Christine Lagarde (President of the ECB), Luis de Guindos (Vice-
President of the ECB), Fabio Panetta, Yves Mersch, Isabel Schnabel and Philip R. Lane.  
18 In the Governing Council, rotation system of voting rights is implemented. The Executive Board 
members hold permanent voting rights, governors from DE, FR, IT, ES and NL share four voting rights 
and all others (14 as of 2020) share 11 voting rights (ECB, 2014). The Governors take turns using the rights 
on a monthly rotation.  
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• the General Council: The General Council comprises the President and the Vice-
President of the ECB and the governors of the national central banks (NCBs) of all 
EU Member States. It issues decisions, recommendations and opinions (ECB, 2020f). 
In accordance with the Statute of the ESCB, the General Council will be dissolved 
when all EU Member States have introduced the single currency. 
• the Supervisory Board: The Supervisory Board is composed of a chair, a vice-chair, 
four ECB representatives and representatives of national supervisory authorities in 
the euro area and is responsible for discussion, planning and implementation of the 
ECB’s supervisory tasks (ECB, 2020j). The Supervisory Board meetings are prepared 
by the Steering Committee comprised of the chair and vice-chair of the Supervisory 
Board, one ECB representative and five representatives of national supervisors19 
(ECB, 2020j).  
The Eurosystem is made up of the ECB and the NCBs of the EU Member States 
whose currency is the euro (Cecchetti and Schoenholz, 2011). The primary objective of 
Eurosystem is the maintenance of price stability for the common good: safeguarding the 
value of the euro (ECB, 2020d). The Eurosystem is responsible for: 
• defining and implementing monetary policy in the euro area; 
• conducting foreign exchange operations; 
• holding and managing the euro area’s reserves of foreign currency; 
• promoting the smooth functioning of payment systems (ECB, 2020d). 
Acting also as a leading financial authority, Eurosystem aims to safeguard financial 
stability and promote European financial integration. 
According to Article 282(1) of the TFEU, the European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB) is established. It comprises the ECB and the NCBs of all EU Member 
States. It is governed by the decision-making bodies of the ECB and its main objective. 
As long as there are EU Member States whose currency is not the euro, it will be necessary 
to make a distinction between the Eurosystem and the ESCB (ECB, 2011d). Under the 
TFEU, the tasks to be carried out through the ESCB are: 
• defining and implementing the monetary policy of the Union, 
• conducting foreign exchange operations,  
 
19 The five representatives of national supervisors are appointed by the Supervisory Board for one year 
based on a rotation system that ensures a fair representation of countries.  
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• holding and managing the official foreign reserves of the Member States, 
• promoting the smooth operation of payment systems of the Member States. 
The ESCB supports the general economic policies in the EU, aiming to promoting 
a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and non-
inflationary growth which respects the environment, a high degree of convergence of 
economic performance and a high level of employment and social protection by 
establishing a common market, an economic and monetary union and by implementing 
the common policies and activities (ECB, 2011d). 
3.3.2 The monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank 
The ECB has adopted a monetary policy strategy20 to ensure a consistent and 
systematic approach to its monetary policy decisions. The strategy embodies five general 
principles to meet the challenges which the ECB is facing while making decisions on the 
appropriate level of short-term interest rates and explaining such decisions to the public. 
First, proper functioning of the money market is central to the transmission of the 
ECB’s policy rates. The smooth transmission of the Governing Council’s monetary policy 
intentions to money market rates depends critically on the behaviour of banks and on their 
willingness to entertain smooth exchanges of liquidity in the interbank market (ECB, 
2011d). Dysfunctional money markets can limit the capacity of monetary policy to 
influence the outlook for price stability through interest rate adjustments. To keep the 
transmission mechanism fully operational and to ensure the maintenance of price stability 
over the medium term, the ECB may need to employ non-standard policy measures, i.e. 
liquidity interventions aimed at facilitating the transmission of the interest rate policy and 
enhancing the flows of credit to the broad economy (ECB, 2011d). 
Second, changes in monetary policy will affect the price level after a number of 
quarters or years due to the lacks and stochastic uncertainty in the transmission process 
(ECB, 2011d). This means that the ECB needs to figure out what policy stance is needed 
today in order to maintain price stability in the future, after the transmission lags unwind. 
In this sense, the single monetary policy in the euro area must be forward-looking and 
pre-emptive. 
Third, transmission lags cause that monetary policy is not able to offset 
unanticipated shocks in the short run, thus some short-term volatility in inflation rates is 
 
20 The monetary policy strategy was adopted in 1998 and further clarified in 2003.  
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unavoidable (ECB, 2011d). Moreover, the complexity of the transmission process is 
followed by uncertainty which surrounds the monetary policy effects. Therefore, 
monetary policy should be oriented on the medium term to avoid excessive activism and 
the introduction of unnecessary volatility into the real economy. 
Fourth, monetary policy will be considerably more effective if it firmly anchors 
inflation expectations. In this respect, the ECB should specify its goal, elaborate and keep 
to a consistent and systematic method for conducting monetary policy, and communicate 
clearly and openly (ECB, 2011d). These are key elements for acquiring a high level of 
credibility, a necessary precondition for influencing the expectations of economic actors. 
Finally, a successful monetary policy has to be broadly based, taking into account 
all relevant information in order to understand the factors driving economic 
developments, and cannot rely on a single model of the economy (ECB, 2011d). The 
reasoning behind is that the ECB faces considerable uncertainty about the reliability of 
economic indicators, the structure of the euro area economy and the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism, as well as other challenges.  
The monetary strategy of the ECB comprises two main elements: 
• the quantitative definition of price stability: Price stability shall be defined as 
a year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the 
euro area of below, but close to, 2% over the medium term (ECB, 2011d).  
• the two-pillar approach to analysis of the risks to price stability: Economic 
analysis and monetary analysis form the basis for the Governing Council’s monetary 
policy decisions. The economic analysis aims at assessing short to medium-term 
determinants of price developments, while the monetary analysis focuses on 
a medium to longer-term horizon of the link between money and prices (ECB, 2011d).  
In the beginning of 2020, the Governing Council launched a review of the ECB’s 
monetary strategy which is expected to be concluded by the end of the year. The review 
will encompass quantitative formulation of price stability, monetary policy toolkit, 
economic and monetary analyses and communication practices based on thorough 
analysis and engagement with all stakeholders (ECB, 2020b).  
3.3.3 Implementation of monetary policy in the euro area 
The operational framework of the Eurosystem consists of the following set of 
instruments: open market operations, standing facilities and minimum reserve 
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requirements for credit institutions (ECB, 2020m). Furthermore, the ECB has 
implemented non-standard monetary policy measures to complement the regular 
operations of the Eurosystem and to react to the economic developments and outlooks. 
Open market operations are the most important operations in steering interest 
rates, managing the liquidity situation in the market and signalling the monetary policy 
stance (ECB, 2011d). There are four types of open market operations: 
• main refinancing operations (MROs): MROs are the most important open market 
operations and represent the key monetary policy instrument of the Eurosystem. 
Through MROs, the Eurosystem lends funds to its counterparties against adequate 
collateral (ECB, 2011d). 
• longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs):  LTROs are aimed at providing 
counterparties with additional longer-term refinancing and can also serve other 
monetary policy objectives (ECB, 2020m). Regular LTROs have a maturity of three 
months but the Eurosystem may also conduct non-regular operations with maturities 
of up to 48 months. 
• fine-tuning operations (FTOs): FTOs are aimed at smoothing the effects on interest 
rates caused by unexpected fluctuations in the liquidity. FTOs are primarily reverse 
transactions but may also be implemented as foreign exchange swaps or the collection 
of fixed-term deposits (ECB, 2020m). 
• structural operations: Structural operations are executed when the ECB wishes to 
adjust the structural position of the Eurosystem vis-à-vis the financial sector (on 
a regular or non-regular basis). They can be carried through reverse transactions, 
outright transactions, and the issuance of debt certificates (ECB, 2020m).  
Standing facilities provide and absorb overnight liquidity, signal the general 
monetary policy stance and bound overnight market interest rates (ECB, 2020i). The 
Eurosystem offers two standing facilities to credit institutions: 
• marginal lending facility: Counterparties may use the marginal lending facility to 
obtain overnight liquidity from the Eurosystem through a reverse transaction with 
their home NCB at a pre-specified interest rate using eligible assets as collateral 
(ECB/2014/60).  
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• deposit facility: Counterparties may use the deposit facility to make overnight 
deposits with the Eurosystem through the home NCB, to which a pre-specified 
interest rate shall be applied.  
The minimum reserve system aims at stabilising money market interest rates and 
creating or enlarging a shortage in structural liquidity (ECB, 2011d). In other words, 
banks in the euro area are required to hold a certain amount of funds as reserves in their 
current accounts at their NCB. A bank’s minimum reserve requirement is defined for six-
week maintenance periods and the level is calculated on the basis of the bank’s balance 
sheet before the start of the maintenance period (ECB, 2016c). Until January 2012, banks 
had to hold a minimum of 2% of certain liabilities, mainly customers’ deposits, at their 
NCB; however, since then, this ratio has been lowered to 1% (ECB, 2016c). 
Since the onset of the financial crisis, the ECB has complemented its operating 
framework with non-standard monetary policy measures. This has included: 
• fixed-rate full allotment: In autumn 2008, the ECB provided unlimited credit to banks 
at fixed interest rates, as banks could not rely on borrowing from each other (ECB, 
2020h).  
• Securities Markets Programme (SMP): The SMP from 2010 involved the purchase of 
debt securities by the Eurosystem from its counterparts which intended to ensure 
depth and liquidity in malfunctioning segments of the debt securities markets and to 
restore an appropriate functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism 
(ECB, 2010).  
• very long-term refinancing operations (VLTROs): In 2011, the Governing Council 
has decided to conduct two VLTROs with a maturity of 36 months and the option of 
early repayment after one year (ECB, 2011a).  
• Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs): Launched in 2012, OMTs aimed at 
safeguarding the transmission mechanism in all euro area countries and the singleness 
of the monetary policy (ECB, 2012b). They break the circuit against self-reinforcing 
fears in sovereign bond markets. 
• a negative interest rate in the deposit facility: The ECB introduced a negative interest 
rate, as the inflation is expected to remain considerably below 2% for a prolonged 
period (ECB, 2014b).  
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• targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs): TLTROs are Eurosystem 
operations that provide financing to credit institutions. By offering banks long-term 
funding at attractive conditions they preserve favourable borrowing conditions for 
banks and stimulate bank lending to the real economy (ECB, 2020k). A first series of 
TLTROs was announced on 5 June 2014, a second series (TLTRO II) on 10 March 
2016 and a third series (TLTRO III) on 7 March 2019. 
• an asset purchase programme (APP): APP was initiated in mid-2014 to support the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism and provide the amount of policy 
accommodation needed to ensure price stability (ECB, 2020a). Asset purchases of 
the ECB influence broader financial conditions (and eventually economic growth and 
inflation) through direct pass-through, portfolio rebalancing and signalling effect 
(ECB, 2019b).   
• forward guidance: The ECB provides information about its future monetary policy 
intentions, based on assessment of the outlook for price stability (ECB, 2017b). Clear 
communication about future monetary policy intentions helps banks, financial market 
participants, businesses and consumers to better understand of how borrowing costs 
are likely to develop in the future. 
3.3.4 Conduct of monetary policy in the euro area 
The Governing Council of the ECB (2020g) sets three key interest rates: 
• main refinancing operations rate: In these operations, banks can borrow liquidity 
from the Eurosystem against collateral on a weekly basis, at a pre-determined interest 
rate. From September 2019, the main refinancing operations rate is 0% (ECB, 2020h). 
• deposit facility rate: Deposit facilities are used to make overnight deposits with the 
Eurosystem at a (pre-set) rate lower than the main refinancing operations rate. From 
September 2019, the marginal lending facility rate is -0.5% (ECB, 2020h). 
• marginal lending facility rate: Marginal lending facility offers overnight credit to 
banks from the Eurosystem at a pre-set interest rate which is higher than the main 
refinancing operations rate. From September 2019, the marginal lending facility rate 
is 0.25% (ECB, 2020h).  
The deposit facility rate and the marginal lending facility rate (Figure 3.1) define 
a corridor for the overnight interest rate at which banks lend to each other. In other words, 
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the deposit facility rate acts as the floor of this corridor and the marginal lending facility 
acts as the ceiling.  
 
Figure 3.1: The phases of the ECB’s monetary policy 
Source: ECB, 2020h (own elaboration) 
In the conduct of monetary policy in the euro area, eight phases can be 
distinguished (see Figure 3.1): 
• first phase – transition to monetary union (mid-1998 to mid-1999): In this phase, 
the responsibility for monetary policy was transferred to the ECB. In response to 
downward risks to price stability, the Governing Council lowered the ECB’s main 
refinancing rate by 50 basis points to 2.5% in April 1999 (ECB, 2011d). 
• second phase – rates raised to contain inflationary pressures (mid-1999 to end-
2000): In this phase, there were increasing concerns that inflationary pressures from 
import prices could have broadly based second-round effects via wage and price-
setting behaviour, and might thus lead to an increase in the long-term inflation 
expectations of the public at large and another cause for concern was the progressive 
accumulation of liquidity, as indicated by the protracted expansion of the supply of 
money and credit (ECB, 2011d). 
• third phase – downward adjustments to key ECB interest rates (early 2001 to 
mid-2003): Over this period, there was continued decline in inflationary pressures 
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the wake of severe shocks that had hit the world economy and global financial markets 
(ECB, 2011d). Therefore, key ECB interest rates were reduced. 
• fourth phase – no changes to key ECB interest rates (mid-2003 to end-2005): 
Contained price pressures despite large increases in commodity and energy prices, as 
well as rises in indirect taxes and administered prices caused the Governing Council 
to keep ECB interest rates unchanged until end-2005 (ECB, 2011d).  
• fifth phase – withdrawal of monetary accommodation (end-2005 to mid-2008): 
The interest rates were raised to address upside risks to price stability in a setting of 
sound economic growth and a rapid expansion of the supply of money and credit in 
the euro area (ECB, 2011d).  
• sixth phase – the ECB’s response to the financial crisis (autumn 2008 to early-
2011): The ECB, like other major central banks, reduced its key interest rates to 
historically low levels and embarked on a series of non-standard policy measures, 
with a view to preserving price stability, stabilising the financial situation and limiting 
contagion vis-à-vis the real economy (ECB, 2011c). 
• seventh phase – volatilities in recovery from the financial crisis (mid-2011 to mid-
2012): From April to July 2011, the Governing Council decided to increase the key 
interest rates, after maintaining them unchanged for almost two years at historically 
low levels,  because underlying pace of monetary expansion was continuing to 
gradually recover, while monetary liquidity remained ample with the potential to 
accommodate price pressures in the euro area. (ECB, 2011d). In November of 
the same year, the rates were reduced, because inflation was expected to decline 
further in the course of 2012 to below 2% (ECB, 2011b). After that, further reductions 
were implemented, and the deposit facility rate reached zero in July 2012. 
• eighth phase – from zero to negative deposit facility rate (since mid-2012): In July 
2012, the key interest rates were lowered again, causing the deposit facility rate to be 
0%.  Inflationary pressure over the policy-relevant horizon had been dampened 
further as some of the previously identified downside had materialised, and at 
the same time, economic growth in the euro area continued to remain weak, with 
heightened uncertainty weighing on confidence and sentiment (ECB, 2012a). In 2014, 
the deposit facility rate was lowered to -0,1%, encouraging people to spend and invest 
rather than save (ECB, 2014b). The lowering has continued and as of 2019, all key 
interest rates are at their historical minimums. 
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3.4 Institutional setup in macroprudential policy and monetary policy 
In the literature, there is no consensus on whether the monetary policy and 
the banking regulation and supervisory functions should be combined in a central bank 
or performed by separate institutions. An argument for combining the monetary and 
regulatory functions is the central bank’s objective of preventing contagious systemic 
crises (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1995). Central banks are suitable as macroprudential 
regulators, as they are ideally positioned to monitor macroeconomic developments and 
the potential implications of monetary policy decisions for leverage and risk taking also 
favour the centralization of macroprudential responsibilities within the central bank 
(Blanchard et al., 2010). The main case usually presented for separation is on grounds of 
conflict of interest (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1995). Moreover, the central bank may 
tend to a “softer” stance against inflation, since interest rate hikes may have a detrimental 
effect on bank balance sheets (Blanchard et al., 2010).  
In the analysed panel of countries, there are four approaches to the institutional 
setup of macroprudential policy and monetary policy: 
• all responsibilities are given to the NCB: In this case, the central bank has a triple 
role: it acts as a macroprudential authority, a designed authority and is a part of 
Eurosystem. This is the case of Belgium, Greece, Italy, Ireland and Portugal. 
• macroprudential authority is separate and the NCB is also a designated 
authority: In this case, implementation of macroprudential policy is independent of 
supervision and monetary policy which are under the NCB. This is the case of 
the Netherlands and Spain. 
• macroprudential and designed authority is one institution separate from the 
NCB: In this case, implementation and supervision of macroprudential policy is under 
an institution outside of the NCB. This is the case of Finland and France. 
• macroprudential authority, designed authority and the NCB are separate: In this 
case, the responsibilities are divided in three institutions. This is the case of Austria, 
Germany and Luxembourg.  
3.5 Data on analysed phenomena 
This sub-chapter describes the data on financial development, economic growth, 
macroprudential and monetary policy, the process of gathering it and (if applicable) 
the process of raw data transformation.  
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3.5.1 Financial development data 
One of the recognised measures of financial development is the Financial 
Development Index (FDI) which can be used for cross-country comparison and 
benchmarking. Svirydzenka (2016) constructed the Financial Development Index from 




Private-sector credit to GDP 
Pension fund assets to GDP 
Mutual fund assets to GDP 
Insurance premiums (life and non-life) to GDP 
Access 
Bank branches per 100 000 adults 
ATMs per 100 000 adults 
Efficiency 
Net interest margin 
Lending-deposits spread 
Non-interest income to total income 
Overhead costs to total assets 
Return on assets 
Return on equity 
Financial Markets 
Depth 
Stock market capitalisation to GDP 
Stocks traded to GDP 
International debt securities of government to GDP 
Total debt securities of financial corporations to GDP 
Total debt securities of non-financial corporations to GDP 
Access 
Percent of market capitalisation outside of top 10 largest companies 
Total number of issuers of debt (domestic and external, non-financial and financial corporations) 
Efficiency Stock market turnover ratio (stocks traded to capitalisation) 
 
Table 3.1: Indicators used in the financial development index 
Source: Svirydzenka (2016) (own elaboration) 
The financial development index contains data from 1980 to 2017 and ranges from 0 to 
1, the higher the number, the more financially developed country. In my research, I use 
the aggregated index and the sub-indices measuring overall development of financial 
institutions and financial markets. To improve usability of this indicator in my research, 
I multiplied the raw data values by 100, as the transformed data enabled me to better track 
first differences which I used in my model. Overall, financial development has progressed 
quite noticeably in my sample of countries (Figure 3.2). From the beginning of the 
European Monetary Union in 1999, the average value was increasing until the global 
financial crisis in 2008, which had its toll on some of the indicators. When I look at 
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the sub-indices (Figures 3.3A and 3.3B), they show that in my panel of countries, the 
development of financial institutions is more uniform than the development of financial 
markets. However, if I look on the data from 1999, the financial markets development is 
more uniform than in the pre-monetary union period. The data also show that the markets 
were affected by the crisis more than the institutions. 
 
Figure 3.2: Analysis of financial development index 
Source: Svirydzenka (2016) (own elaboration) 
3.5.2 Macroprudential policy data 
For capturing the macroprudential policy, I use two indices: the Macroprudential 








































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.3A and 3.3B: Sub-indices of financial development 
Source: Svirydzenka (2016) (own elaboration) 
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Cerutti et al. (2017). The first index captures number of implemented macroprudential 
policy instruments and the second one also takes into account the effect of such 
instruments. Both indices are of a dummy type, so they account for number of employed 
macroprudential policy instruments. In addition, the second index includes the direction 
of policy changes (but not the intensity of the change).  
The Macroprudential Policy Index (henceforth MPI) contains 12 macroprudential 
policy instruments as simple binary variables (Figure 3.4A). The macroprudential 
instruments covered are: general countercyclical capital buffer/requirement, leverage 
ratio for banks, time-varying/dynamic loan-loss provisioning, caps on the loan-to-value 
ratio, debt-to-income ratio, limits on domestic currency loans, limits on foreign currency 
loans, reserve requirement ratios in foreign currency, levy/tax on financial institutions, 
capital surcharges on systemically important financial institutions, limits on interbank 
exposures and concentration limits. The index for each of the employed instruments takes 
the value of 1 if it is active and the value of 0 if it is inactive. An overall macroprudential 
index is calculated cumulatively, as the simple sum of the scores for all instruments. MPI 
does not take into account the effect of the instruments (whether the policy is tightening 
or loosening).  
The Prudential Policy Index (henceforth PPI) comprises actions of (micro- and 
macro-) prudential nature and records changes including their effect (Figure 3.4B). It 
covers nine types of prudential instruments (general capital requirements, real estate 
credit related specific capital buffers, consumer credit related specific capital buffers, 
other specific capital buffers, domestic currency capital requirements, foreign currency 
capital requirements, interbank exposure limits, concentration limits and loan-to-value 
(LTV) ratio limits. In PPI, an instrument has a 1 or -1 entry, depending on whether 
the prudential tool was tightened or loosened in a given quarter (Cerutti et al., 2017). 
The index equals 0 in those quarters when no change occurs. As mentioned before, the 
data are on a quarterly basis, so I calculated an average for each year for the cumulative 
PPI where all individual instruments are adjusted to have maximum and minimum 
changes of 1 and -1. Since the ready-to-use data ends in 2014, I appended the PPI based 
on data from Budnik and Kleibl (2018) and ESRB (2020d) following the methodology of 
the original index. 
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The two indices show that the frequency of use of macroprudential policy 
instruments is growing in time. Furthermore, the nature of the policies shifted from 
loosening in the beginning of the sample to tightening at the end of the sample. As of 
2017, all instruments implemented in the panel of countries were of a tightening nature.   
3.5.3 Economic growth data 
In my research, I work with three indicators that capture economic growth: gross 
domestic product (GDP), GDP per capita and gross value added (GVA). The data on all 
variables are seasonally adjusted. 
For GDP, the data on its growth is available from 1980 to 2017 on an annual basis. 
Figures 3.5A (GDP growth) and 3.5B (GDP per capita growth) shows the minimum-
maximum and first quartile-third quartile intervals together with mean (average of the 
values for each year). In 1991, the minimum takes an extreme value, as Finland went 
through a banking crisis which had negative impacts on economic growth. In 1993, 
the mean took a negative value, because eight countries of the sample observed negative 
growth rate, but they were able to recover the following year. The Figures also show how 
the crisis affected the growth rates and how the countries in my panel were affected 
differently (most were able to recover in few years, Greece observed positive growth rate 
only in 2017). The data for GVA are available on an annual basis from 1996 to 2017. For 

















































































































































































Figures 3.4A and 3.4B: Evolution of prudential measures 
Source: Cerutti et al., 2018 (left-hand graph) and Cerutti et al., 2017 (right-hand graph) (own elaboration) 
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The extreme negative values are from 2009 (Finland’s GVA was -9% at that time) and 
2011 when Greece had -9% growth rate as well.  
In all three datasets, there was one extreme value which belongs to Ireland in 2015. 
The main reason behind the particularly high growth rates was a massive relocation of 
large multinational companies to Ireland, which caused that sales (production) generated 
from the use of intellectual property now contribute to Irish GDP rather than to other 
countries’ GDP (OECD, 2016). Therefore, I removed these values and used interpolation 








Figures 3.5A, 3.5B and 3.5C: Analysis of economic growth data 
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3.5.4 Monetary policy data 
As mentioned in previous chapters, the choice of my sample was motivated by the 
fact that the countries share common monetary policy. I employ two indicators which 
capture monetary policy in the panel of analysed countries – the Euro Interbank Offered 
Rate (EURIBOR) and Monetary Conditions Index (MCI).  
Earlier, monetary aggregates were used to indicate monetary policy stance; 
however, since money is endogenous, their use is no longer justified (Friedman and 
Schwartz, 1963; Cagan, 1972). Bernanke and Blinder (1992) use the interest rate set by 
the central bank (or the inter-bank rate) as the indicator of monetary policy measures. 
An alternative to the interest/inter-bank rate is a composite indicator as a combination of 
variables describing monetary policy and the monetary stance.  
EURIBOR is the rate at which banks in the EU and European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) could obtain funds in the wholesale unsecured market (ECB, 2019d). 
It is calculated for several maturities (one week, and one, three, six and twelve months). 
I use the three-month EURIBOR rate which has available data from 1995, transforming 
the raw monthly data to annual data by averaging them for each year.  
The MCI from Hodula (2019) captures the effect of conventional and 
unconventional monetary policies and is calculated from the set of 14 variables which 
reflect interest rates, monetary aggregates, ECB balance sheet items and exchange rate. 
The MCI is similar to that obtained by Babecká Kucharčuková et al. (2016) and Malovaná 
and Frait (2017). The data are available on a monthly basis from 2000, for my model, 
I calculate the annual values as averages of the monthly data for each year.  
In Figure 3.3, I plot the two chosen indicators of monetary policy against the main 
ECB rates. The MCI is in line with the path of main ECB monetary policy rates, mainly 
prior and during the financial crisis. In 2011, the MCI starts to deviate from the policy 
rates, as the ECB started with non-standard monetary policy measures to support the euro 
area economy. Since 2014, MCI indicates loosening of monetary policy related to 
the Securities Market Programme and long-term refinancing operations programme. 
The launch of Assets Purchase Programme is captured by further loosening of the MCI.  
As for EURIBOR, this indicator follows the policy rates (predominantly the main 
refinancing operations rate) in the whole period with a deviation during the financial 
crisis. Its development can be described by the same phasing as used in Chapter 3.3.3. 
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Although it does not include non-standard monetary policy measures as MCI does, it is 
still a standard in the financial industry, as it helps to ensure a homogeneous pricing 
benchmark for the entire money market yield curve across the euro area (ECB, 2013). To 
extend the data availability, I used an OECD (2020) database on national interbank rates 
which were active prior to the introduction of EURIBOR and added them to the indicator.  
 
Figure 3.6: ECB rates vs. EURIBOR 3M vs. MCI 
Source: ECB, 2020c; Hodula, 2019 (own elaboration) 
 
3.6 Summary of the chapter 
This chapter focuses on the analysed panel of European countries and explains 
how their institutional frameworks are set up in macroprudential and monetary policy.  
Macroprudential policy framework derives from international standards set by 
BCBS with some additional features which reflect the situation in the EU. At the EU 
level, the European Systemic Risk Board is responsible for monitoring and assessment of 
systemic risk and it also serves as a source of a macroprudential measures database which 
will be used in the empirical part of this thesis. At the national level, institutional 
arrangements vary country by country, as some countries employ separated approach on 
macroprudential and designated authority while other have an arrangement where these 
two bodies are integrated in one institution. 
Since the panel of analysed countries comprises only euro area countries, 
the monetary policy is under responsibility of the European Central Bank/Eurosystem. 
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Deposit facility Marginal lending facility Main refinancing operations
MCI EURIBOR 3M
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monetary policy in the euro area. In the country-by-country analysis, I focus on if and 
how the institutional setup of macroprudential policy and monetary policy are linked and 
how many responsibilities are under the national central banks in this regard.  
In the data part, I introduce and analyse the main variables for the empirical part. 
For economic growth, I will work with the most common measures (GDP and GVA). For 
financial development, the most suitable data are indices from Svirydzenka (2016). For 
capturing macroprudential policy, I employ two indices, as one focuses on frequency of 
use of instruments and the other on effects of such measures. As the monetary policy 
stances, I use an index capturing both conventional and unconventional monetary 
measures and EURIBOR appended by national 3-month interbank rates. 
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4 Analysis of interactions between the phenomena in 
the panel of countries 
This chapter aims at examining the influence of financial development and 
macroprudential policy and its interaction on economic growth in the selected panel of 
countries.  
4.1 Methodology of the empirical analysis 
4.1.1 Theoretical background  
Panel data is a data set constructed from repeated cross sections over time 
(Woolridge, 2013). According to Hsiao (2006), panel data have several advantages over 
cross-sectional or time-series data: 
• more accurate inference of model parameters: Panel data usually contain more 
degrees of freedom and more sample variability than cross-sectional data, hence the 
efficiency of econometric estimate is improved. 
• greater capacity for capturing the complexity of human behaviour: Panel data enable 
construction of more complicated behavioural hypotheses, control of the impact of 
the omitted variables, uncovering dynamic relationships, generation of more accurate 
predictions and providing micro foundations for aggregate data analysis. 
• simplifying computation and statistical inference: The availability of panel data 
simplifies computation and inference in analysis of nonstationary time series, enables 
different transformations to eliminate measurement errors and allows researchers to 
simplify the analysed problem by only focusing on the subsample. 
As mentioned in Baltagi (2008), limitations of panel data include: 
• design and data collection problems: In panel data analysis, there may be problems of 
incomplete coverage, reference period, the use of bounding and time-in-sample bias. 
• distortions of measurement errors: Measurement errors may arise because of faulty 
responses due to unclear questions, memory errors, deliberate distortion of responses 
(e.g. prestige bias), inappropriate informants, mis-recording of responses and 
interviewer effects. 
• selectivity problems: These include self-selectivity (censorship within the sample), 
nonresponse (one or more questions are left unanswered) and attrition (issues with 
representativeness of the sample. 
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• short time-series dimension: Typical micro panels cover a short time span, so 
asymptotic arguments rely crucially on the number of individuals tending to infinity. 
• cross-section dependence: Macro panels on countries or regions with long time series 
that do not account for cross-country dependence may lead to misleading inference. 
Therefore, panel unit root tests are suggested to examine this phenomenon. 
In panel data regression, there are static and dynamic models. Static model is 
a model where only contemporaneous variables affect the dependent variable 
(Woolridge, 2013). Fixed effects model allows the unobserved effects to be arbitrarily 
correlated with the explanatory variable in each time period, while random effects model 
assumes that the unobserved effect is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in each 
time period (Baltagi, 2008). Dynamic model includes lags of the dependent variable to 
provide an adequate characterization of many economic dynamic adjustments (Bun and 
Sarafidis, 2013). Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed a generalised method of moments 
(GMM) procedure21, while Ahn and Schmidt (1995) derived additional nonlinear moment 
restrictions not exploited by the GMM estimator. This literature is generalized and 
extended by Arellano and Bover (1995)22 and Blundell and Bond (1998)23. 
Furthermore, panel data models contain control variables which act as instrument 
variables (IV). Instrument variables must be correlated with the included endogenous 
variable(s), and orthogonal to the error process (Baum et al., 2003). In the model, 
instrument variables act as a natural safeguard against reverse causality, which allows the 
results to be interpreted as causal relationships rather than mere correlations. An 
interaction term is used to include interaction between two explanatory variables. 
Interaction term can be defined as an independent variable that is the product of two 
explanatory variables (Woolridge, 2013). In the model, I use it to see the implications of 
financial development when macroprudential policy is active.  
The validity of GMM can be proven by diagnostic tests. The Arellano-Bond test 
tests for autocorrelation of the residuals. By construction, the residuals of the differenced 
equation should possess serial correlation, but if the assumption of serial independence 
 
21 The GMM estimator is a way of exploiting information from the general form of population moment 
conditions. 
22 Arellano and Bover (1995) present a GMM formulation with unrestricted covariance matrix, together 
with a derivation of the information bound for these models. 
23 Blundell and Bond (1998) consider two estimators which can improve the precision of the standard first-
differenced GMM estimator.  
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in the original errors is warranted, the differenced residuals should not exhibit significant 
AR (2) behaviour. If a significant AR (2) statistic is encountered, the second lags of 
endogenous variables will not be appropriate instruments for their current values. The 
Hansen test focuses on overidentifying restriction. The Hansen statistic will be identically 
zero for any exactly identified equation and will be positive for an overidentified 
equation.  
4.1.2 Methods and processes in the empirical analysis 
In this chapter, I describe concrete steps in the process in my empirical research. 
Based on literature review, the working hypothesis is that financial development has 
positive effect on economic growth in the analysed panel of countries. In other words, 
I assume that faster financial development implicates faster economic growth. Before the 
econometric modelling, I construct a basic specification of the model (based on economic 
theory and literature review) and prepare all raw data. After that, I conduct a time series 
analysis on the raw data to examine their stationarity and where applicable and 
appropriate, I transform the data to make them stationary. 
When the data is ready, I use dynamic panel regression (GMM estimator with 
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors) for the basic specification. I have chosen 
the dynamic model to cover omitted variable bias and to account for transmission lags in 
the model. In the regression, I work with different indicators for economic growth (as 
mentioned in Chapter 3.5.3) and monetary policy (as mentioned in Chapter 3.5.4). 
Together with the coefficients for each variables, I table the p-values for two diagnostic 
tests: the test of the null hypothesis that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit 
no second-order serial correlation (AR (2) test) and p-values for the test of the null 
hypothesis that the instruments used are valid (Hansen). After that, I employ static panel 
data regression with fixed effects and compare its estimates with the GMM results to 
check for robustness.  
As I also examine the influence of both financial development and 
macroprudential policy on economic growth, I extend the baseline specification by adding 
an interaction term which enables me to study the impact of financial development on 
economic growth when the macroprudential policy is active. After analysis of interactions 
between financial development as a whole and macroprudential policy, I employ the sub-
indices of financial development (see Chapter 3.5.1) to explore channels through which 
macroprudential policy affects the finance-growth relationship. 
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4.2 Panel regression 
4.2.1 Specification of the model 
In the empirical analysis, I use dynamic model of panel regression where the 
dependent variable is lagged, and the control variables serve as instrumental variables to 
limit reverse causality. The baseline specification is as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
  
(4.1) 
where 𝑖 and 𝑡 are indices for countries and years respectively, 𝛼 stands for 
country-fixed effects, 𝑦 is a measure of economic growth and 𝐹𝐷𝐼 is a measure of 
financial development. The beta coefficient () measures the strength of the finance-
growth relationships. The vector of control variables includes: (i) trade openness (export 
to GDP), (ii) labour productivity growth, (iii) inflation rate, (iv) monetary policy stance 
(interbank rate/EURIBOR or MCI) and (v) financial crisis dummy24. To remove country 
fixed effects, the model is specified in first differences (): 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽∆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + ∆ 𝑖𝑡 
 
(4.2) 
In the differenced model, ∆ 𝑖𝑡 is a function of 𝑖𝑡−𝑖, so the correlation between the lagged 
dependent variable and the differenced error is remaining. Nickell (1981) state that this 
correlation causes the commonly employed standard fixed effects estimator to produce 
biased estimates. Therefore, I use the system-GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond 
(1991), as it addresses the endogeneity problems resulting from the correlation.  
To control the effect of macroprudential policy on financial development, 
I augment equation (4.2) with an interaction term which is the product of financial 
development index and macroprudential policy indicator25 (𝑀𝑃𝑃). The extended 
specification is as following:  
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽∆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾∆𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 × 𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
+ ∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + ∆ 𝑖𝑡 
 
(4.3) 
In the extended specification (equation 4.3), I extend my range of models by using 
interaction terms. I employ three interaction terms for aggregated financial development 
(𝐹𝐷𝐼 ×  𝑀𝑃𝐼 and 𝐹𝐷𝐼 ×  𝑃𝑃𝐼 respectively), development of financial institutions 
 
24 The financial crisis dummy takes the value of 1 if there was a crisis and 0 otherwise.  
25 As macroprudential policy indicators, I use Macroprudential Policy Index (MPI) and Prudential Policy 
Index (PPI). See Chapter 3.5.3 for further description. 
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(𝐹𝐷𝐼_𝐹𝐼 ×  𝑀𝑃𝐼 and 𝐹𝐷𝐼_𝐹𝐼 ×  𝑃𝑃𝐼 respectively) and development of financial 
markets (𝐹𝐷𝐼_𝐹𝑀 ×  𝑀𝑃𝐼 and 𝐹𝐷𝐼_𝐹𝑀 ×  𝑃𝑃𝐼 respectively) with macroprudential 
policy.  
The choice of control variables deserves further elaboration. My reasoning is as 
follows:  
• Trade openness – Emery (1968) proves a positive correlation between export and 
economic growth and Balassa (1978) indicates that export growth favourably affects 
the rate of economic growth. Chang et al. (2009) state that trade openness is associated 
with faster economic growth and can be further enhanced by implementation of 
complementary reforms aiming at removing trade barriers. I work with a similar 
hypothesis where more open economies benefit from faster economic growth. 
• Labour productivity – ILO (2013) finds that that increases in labour productivity 
within economic sectors are the main drivers of economic growth and in particular, 
growth in industry and services plays an important role for aggregate economic 
growth. I work with a hypothesis that faster labour productivity growth implicates 
faster economic growth. 
• Inflation rate – The findings of Barro (1996) show that economic growth is enhanced 
by lower inflation. Sarel (1995) finds that when the inflation rate is above 8 percent, 
the estimated effect of inflation on economic growth is significant, robust and 
powerful. López-Villavicencio and Mignon (2011) state that there is a threshold under 
which inflation exerts a positive effect on growth. Using the optics of macroeconomic 
models, I expect the inflation-growth relationship to be positive. 
• ECB monetary policy stance – Monetary policy affects inflation, the unemployment 
rate or the rate of growth of an economy by altering aggregate supply and demand. It 
is of a countercyclical nature, but the transmission of monetary policy to the real 
economy is lagged (Havránek and Rusnák, 2013). To account for this, the monetary 
policy indicators enter the model lagged by one year. My hypothesis is that monetary 
policy is countercyclical, so its effects on the economic growth is expected to be 
negative. 
• Financial crisis dummy – The binary dummy variable captures systemic crises 
which may take form of global financial crisis or national crises. Jarrow (2014) shows 
that financial crises negatively affects economic growth and capital. My hypothesis 
is that financial crises have a strong and negative impact on economic growth. 
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4.2.2 Summary and analysis of input data 
For both baseline and extended specification, I use 13 different variables: three 
measures of financial development, three measures of economic growth, two indicators 
for macroprudential policy and two monetary policy stances (Table 4.1). I work with data 
on an annual frequency from 1980 to 2017. The models where GDP growth and GDP per 
capita growth are employed are unbalanced, while the models with GVA growth are 
balanced due to limitations in this dataset which are common for all countries in the panel. 
The measures of financial development were available as a 0-1 index. To improve 
their usability and better observation of captured differences, I multiplied the initial 
values by 100. After that, I transformed the data to first differences, as the initial data 
were not stationary. The measures of economic growth (GDP, GDP per capita and GVA) 
are ready-to-use data in annual growth rates. The Macroprudential Policy Index is ready 
to use without any transformations. Regarding the Prudential Policy Index, the data are 
on a quarterly basis, so I used an average value of the quarters for each year. Both indices 
were not transformed because of their binary nature. 
Among the control variables, trade openness and inflation were available as ready-
to-use data for all countries for the whole period. The data on labour productivity were 
also available from 1980, but there are some gaps (for Austria, the data are available from 
1996 and for Greece, the availability starts in 1984). Regarding data on monetary policy, 
the Monetary Conditions Index is available from 2000. In the case of EURIBOR, 
I extended the dataset by adding national 3-month interbank rates for the 1980-1993 
period. In these, there are some missing data (in the case of Austria, Finland, Greece, 
Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal). The financial crisis binary dummy is created on the 




Table 4.1: Data overview and summary statistics 
Source: own elaboration in STATA 
Note: The columns “Start date” and “End date” capture beginning and ending of the sample period for all countries. To account for missing data, the column “Gaps” indicates whether there 









Min Max Units Source Gaps Description 
GDP growth GDP_GR 1980 2017 2.21 2.64 -9.13 10.90 % 
The World Bank 
(2020b)  
no 
The market value of final goods and services 
produced in the economy during a year. 
GDP per capita growth GDPPC_GR 1980 2017 1.71 2.57 -9.00 9.80 % 
The World Bank 
(2020c)  
no 
The value of all goods and services produced 
by a country divided by the country's 
population.  
GVA growth GVA_GR 1996 2017 1.97 2.79 -9.69 10.22 % WIIW (2020)  no 
Output (at basic prices) minus intermediate 
consumption (at purchaser prices). 
Financial development index FDI 1980 2017 59.52 15.95 25.07 91.16 index Svirzdyenka (2016) no 
Index capturing depth. access and efficiency of 
both financial institutions and markets. 
FDI (institutions) FDI_FI 1980 2017 72.44 11.89 44.29 96.11 index Svirzdyenka (2016) no 
Index capturing depth, access and efficiency of 
financial institutions. 
FDI (markets) FDI_FM 1980 2017 45.33 23.31 3.77 90.83 index Svirzdyenka (2016) no 
Index capturing depth, access and efficiency of 
financial markets. 
Macroprudential Policy Index MPI 2000 2017 1.75 1.33 0.00 5.00 index Cerutti et al. (2015) no 
Index capturing cumulative use of 
macroprudential policy measures (without their 
effect). 
Prudential Policy Index PPI 2000 2017 0.16 1.78 -2.00 7.00 index Cerutti et al. (2017) no 
Index capturing changes in prudential policy 
tools (tightening or loosening). 
Labour productivity growth LABOUR 1980 2017 1.71 2.57 -5.81 19.87 % OECD (2020a) yes 
Labour productivity reflects growth in GDP 
per hour worked. 
Trade openness EXPORT 1980 2017 47.79 36.20 14.05 221.20 % 
The World Bank 
(2020a)  
no 
Value of all goods and other market services 
provided to the rest of the world. 
Inflation INFLATION 1980 2017 4.07 4.79 -4.48 28.38 % 
The World Bank 
(2020d)  
no 
The annual percentage change in the cost to the 
average consumer of acquiring a basket of 
goods and services. 
Monetary Conditions Index MCI 2000 2017 1.93 1.51 -1.41 4.26 % Hodula (2019) no 
Index capturing the effect of conventional and 
unconventional monetary policies. 




The national interbank rates (data from 1980 to 
1993) and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate 
(EURIBOR) from 1994 onwards.  
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4.3 Estimation results 
4.3.1 Implications of financial development for economic growth 
In the baseline specification (equation 4.2), I focus on the finance-growth 
relationship separately, without the influence of macroprudential policy. Each of the 
economic growth measures enter separately into the model and for capturing financial 
development, I use the aggregated index. The models where the MCI is used (columns 
1a-1c) are based on balanced datasets, while the models with interbank rate/EURIBOR 
are unbalanced when GDP growth and GDP per capita growth (columns 2a-2b) is 
employed and balanced when GVA growth is used. 
The results for the baseline specification (Table 4.2) already indicate some 
interesting patterns. The response of economic growth to financial development is 
positive and statistically significant. The beta coefficients (third line) confirm the view 
where the finance-growth relationship is positive, i.e. faster financial development 
implicates faster economic growth. Faster improvements in depth, access and efficiency 
of financial institutions and financial markets contribute to faster economic growth. Faster 
financial development implicates that financial instruments, markets and intermediaries 
mitigate the effects of imperfect information, limited enforcement of contracts and 
transaction costs better, thus contributing to the improvements in functions of the 
financial sector which ensures sustainable growth.  Faster establishment and expansion 
of institutions, instruments and markets within the financial system support investment 
and economic growth process. Financial development promotes economic growth 
through accumulation of capital and technological progress, reduces in poverty and 
inequality by broadening access to finance to the poor and vulnerable and by increases in 
investment and productivity. To rephrase it, the more developed and better-functioning 
financial systems, the faster economic growth can be observed.  
My results are in line with those of King and Levine (1993) who conclude that 
indicators of the level of financial development are strongly and robustly correlated with 
economic growth. Furthermore, the results are in accordance with conclusions of three 
meta-analyses on the finance-growth relationship. Arestis et al. (2014) analyse 
1151 estimates from 69 papers and find that there is a positive and significant effect of 
more finance on growth. Valickova et al. (2015) show that 1334 estimates from 
67 analysed studies document a moderate, but statistically significant positive link 
between financial development and economic growth. Based on a meta-analysis of 
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68 empirical studies, Biljsma et al. (2018) point to a positive, but decreasing effect of 
financial development on economic growth, showing that pre-crisis estimates (e. g. from 
the above-mentioned seminal study of King and Levine) were overly optimistic. 
However, the meta-analyses work with studies that use proxies capturing particular 
aspects of financial development (financial depth, bank ratio, financial activity, stock 
markets) or their alternatives26, but no aggregate measures (which is present in my 
model). Therefore, the employment of the aggregated financial development index which 
captures multiple aspects of the phenomena as a single variable to the model analysing 
the finance-growth nexus is my contribution to the contemporary research of this 
relationship. 
The coefficients of labour productivity (fourth line) indicate that there is a positive 
and statistically significant relationship between labour productivity and economic 
growth. The growth in labour productivity (caused for instance by improvements in 
human capital and technological change) positively impacts economic growth, i.e. faster 
labour productivity growth implicates faster economic growth. My findings prove that 
labour productivity is a key contributor to economic performance (ILO, 2013).  
The coefficients of trade openness (fifth line) show that the relationship between 
export and growth is positive and statistically significant. The more open an economy is, 
the faster growth it observes. This is in line with both the neoclassical approach and the 
endogenous growth theory. Free flow of goods and services is one of the key freedoms in 
the European Union and the benefits of Single Market and common trade policy with 
third countries are enhancing the effects of trade openness on economic growth. The 
results are in line with findings of Chang et al. (2009) who state that trade openness is 
associated with faster economic growth and can be further enhanced by implementation 
of complementary reforms aiming at removing trade barriers. 
There is a positive and statistically significant relationship between inflation and 
economic growth (sixth line). In the models where the MCI is employed (columns 1a-
1c), this can be explained by the fact that the analysed time frame is shorter (2000-2017) 
and in this period, the average inflation rate was below the target value of 2 %, thus these 
 
26 The proxies used in studies analysed in the meta-analysis were: liquid liabilities to GDP, bank credit to 
the sum of bank credit and domestic assets of the central bank, domestic credit to GDP, credit allocated to 
private enterprises to GDP, stock market capitalisation ratio, stock market activity, stock market turnover 
ratio, overall stock market development, share of resources devoted to the financial system and deposit 
money bank assets to GDP.  
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results are in line with findings of Barro (1996) which indicate that economic growth is 
enhanced by lower inflation. In the models with interbank rates and EURIBOR (columns 
2a-2c) which work on a longer time span, the results are in accordance with findings of 
López-Villavicencio and Mignon (2011), who state that there exists a threshold under 
which inflation exerts a positive effect on growth. 
The coefficients on the MCI and interbank rates/EURIBOR are negative and 
statistically significant, implicating that growth in monetary policy measures negatively 
affects economic growth. When the key interest rates are lowered, the costs of borrowing 
are lower, resulting in higher investment and consumption and vice versa. From 
comparison between the two indicators, it can be concluded that the existence of monetary 
union improves the countercyclical effects of monetary policy (columns 1a-1c), whilst 
inclusion of the pre-monetary union period (columns 2a-2c) weakens these effects. My 
findings are in line with Vickers (2000) who state that monetary policy aimed at securing 
and maintaining price stability is supportive to economic growth and that the deepening 
of the Single Market caused by monetary policy is also positive for growth. 
In line with the economic theory, the financial crisis dummy has negative and 
statistically significant relationship with economic growth. This indicates that economic 
growth was significantly slowed down during the periods of systemic crises included in 
the dummy. The costs of financial crises take the biggest toll on economic growth among 
all control variables.  
The p-values of Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of the residuals (AR (2)) 
are all (except column 2c) statistically significant, so null hypothesis (the errors in the first 
difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation) is rejected. On 
the opposite hand, results of AR (2) for column 2c indicate that the null hypothesis is 
retained. Regarding the p-values of Hansen test on overidentifying restriction, they are in 
all cases close to zero and therefore, the null hypothesis (the instruments used are valid) 
is rejected.  
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  (1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c) 














-0.287** -0.221* -0.275*** -0.176* -0.186** -0.209** 
(0.128) (0.123) (0.090) (0.099) (0.088) (0.105) 
Financial development 
index 
0.134*** 0.132*** 0.153*** 0.132*** 0.129*** 0.135*** 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) 
Labour productivity 
growth 
0.520*** 0.542*** 0.468** 0.605*** 0.623*** 0.540*** 
(0.177) (0.186) (0.197) (0.144) (0.143) (0.205) 
Trade openness 
0.019*** 0.005** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.007** 0.020*** 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) 
Inflation 
0.684*** 0.541*** 0.825*** 0.291*** 0.250*** 0.606** 
(0.208) (0.189) (0.258) (0.094) (0.083) (0.237) 
Monetary Conditions 
Index 
-0.496*** -0.575*** -0.518***       
(0.059) (0.073) (0.110)       
Interbank 
rates/EURIBOR 
     -0.135*** -0.125*** -0.042 
     (0.039) (0.042) (0.057) 
Financial crisis dummy 
-2.430*** -2.004*** -2.089*** -2.476*** -2.234*** -2.476*** 
(0.686) (0.596) (0.458) (0.691) (0.619) (0.561) 
Constant 
0.719** 0.974** 0.458 1.034*** 0.955*** 0.030 
(0.359) (0.430) (0.341) (0.372) (0.317) (0.343) 
Observations 204 204 204 381 381 252 
AR (2) 0.042 0.024 0.016 0.041 0.030 0.053 
Hansen 0.024 0.026 0.022 0.009 0.009 0.029 
 
Table 4.2: Results for the baseline specification 
Source: own elaboration in STATA 
Note: Driscoll and Kraay (1998) robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Different number of observations is caused by availability 
of data (as explained in Chapter 4.2.2). 
 
4.3.2 Interaction between aggregated financial development and 
macroprudential policy 
In this chapter, I employ the extended model (equation 4.3). In addition to 
the baseline specification, I use two indicators capturing macroprudential policy – 
the 𝑀𝑃𝐼 which contains the frequency of used instruments regardless of their nature, and 
the 𝑃𝑃𝐼 which includes effects of the policy decisions as well. Each measure of economic 
growth enters in separate models, combined with either the MCI (columns 1a-1c and 2a-
2c) or interbank rate/EURIBOR (columns 1d-1f and 2d-2f) as the monetary policy stance 
and I use the aggregated financial development index. All models included in this chapter 
work with balanced data for 2000-2017 period.  
The results (Table 4.3) show that the inclusion of macroprudential policy (without 
considering its activity) in the model weakens the positive effects of financial 
development on economic growth. However, faster financial development still has 
positive impact on economic growth and the coefficients are all statistically significant. 
As mentioned before, financial development implicates improvements in the functions of 
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the financial sector which positively contributes to economic growth. When financial 
development is limited, the impact on economic growth is correspondingly lower, 
because its contribution to the economy is outweighed by other variables.  
The coefficients of the two macroprudential policy indicators differ based on 
which one is employed. In the case of the 𝑀𝑃𝐼, the values are negative and not statistically 
significant (except column 1b) which is related to the fact that it captures only frequency 
of changes in macroprudential policy nature, regardless of their nature (tightening or 
loosening). In general, more frequent use of macroprudential policy measures seems to 
moderately reduce the economic growth. Macroprudential policy aims at limiting 
excessive booms in asset prices and credit, as excess growth in these variables causes 
financial instability and lower economic growth (which may end up as a crisis situation). 
Since macroprudential policy is of a preventive nature, it may be overly limiting in terms 
of its influence on consumption and investment, thus causing lower economic growth. 
The results are in line with Sánchez and Rohn (2016) who also employ the 𝑀𝑃𝐼 to 
investigate the link between macroprudential policy and GDP growth and conclude that 
the use of macroprudential policies may be associated with lower economic growth. For 
the 𝑃𝑃𝐼, the coefficients are positive (except column 2b and 2e), but also not statistically 
significant. Macroprudential policy generate benefits for the economy by reducing 
systemic risk and lowering the probabilities of crises and improving financial stability. 
Since financial stability is a prerequisite for sustainable growth, the growing role of 
macroprudential policy is expected to contribute to faster economic growth. These 
findings are in line with Boar et al. (2017) whose findings conclude that more active 
macroprudential policies are associated with higher growth rates (in their study, they used 
real GDP per capita growth). The sensitivity of research outcomes on macroprudential 
policy to specific modelling assumptions which is present in my estimations is 
documented in the meta-analysis of Fidrmuc and Lind (2018)27 who state that the 
estimates are mainly driven by modelling choices and the general focus of a study. Since 
macroprudential policy includes relatively new tools, more evidence and experience are 
needed to offer a conclusive response regarding the impacts of macroprudential policy on 
real economy. 
 
27 This meta-analysis finds a relatively moderate negative effect on the real economy in response to a change 
in minimum capital requirements. I did not include these findings in my description, as the sample of 
analysed studies works mostly with pre-crisis periods (before the introduction of new instruments in 
BASEL III) and the examined macroprudential policy variable was a single measure.  
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The coefficients of the interaction term (𝐹𝐷𝐼  𝑀𝑃𝐼 and 𝐹𝐷𝐼  𝑃𝑃𝐼 respectively) 
show that active macroprudential policy has a positive impact on the contribution of 
financial development for economic growth. In other words, macroprudential policy 
enhances financial development in a way where their interaction promotes economic 
growth, as it limits the risk of widespread disruptions to the provision of financial services 
based on financial development and eliminates possible impacts of such disruptions on 
the economy. First, I used an indicator which captures changes in frequency of use of 
macroprudential measures and an increase in it indicates increased frequency of use, 
without considering the effect of a policy measure. The coefficients of the 𝐹𝐷𝐼  𝑀𝑃𝐼 
interaction (columns 1a-1f) are positive, but not statistically significant. Based on that, 
the more frequent use of macroprudential policy measures restrict the effect of financial 
development on economic growth, but the interaction between the two phenomena has a 
positive relationship with economic growth. Second, I used an indicator containing the 
frequency of tightening policy measures where an increase in corresponds to growth in 
restrictive macroprudential policy measures. The coefficients of the 𝐹𝐷𝐼  𝑃𝑃𝐼 
regression (columns 2a-2f) indicate that more active use of restrictive macroprudential 
policy measures limits risks in the financial sector, it also limits the costs of possible 
financial crises (i.e. macroprudential policies are designed to make financial crisis less 
severe). To sum it up, macroprudential policy aims at reducing the risks from excessive 
growth caused by financial development and deepening while maintaining sustainable 
economic growth. Therefore, it should be actively implemented to restrict the possible 
disruptions. Over other public policies, macroprudential measures benefits from smaller 
implementation lags, the possibility to tailor the policy instruments to specific risks 






Table 4.3: Results for the extended specification with 𝐹𝐷𝐼  𝑀𝑃𝑃 interaction term 
Source: own elaboration in STATA 
Note: Driscoll and Kraay (1998) robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
































-0.275** -0.205* -0.262*** -0.234* -0.178 -0.216** -0.223* -0.192 -0.252*** -0.210* -0.152 -0.188* 
(0.126) (0.124) (0.086) (0.127) (0.119) (0.093) (0.119) (0.122) (0.094) (0.127) (0.117) (0.101) 
Financial development 
index 
0.086** 0.077* 0.126*** 0.097** 0.092** 0.134** 0.246*** 0.142*** 0.166*** 0.148*** 0.143*** 0.164*** 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.047) (0.046) (0.043) (0.060) (0.092) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) 
Macroprudential Policy 
Index 
-0.186 -0.302** -0.209 -0.023 -0.147 -0.057             
(0.192) (0.144) (0.200) (0.162) (0.122) (0.175)             
Prudential Policy Index 
            0.129 -0.068 0.051 0.019 -0.012 0.101 
            (0.134) (0.057) (0.106) (0.066) (0.051) (0.098) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼  𝑀𝑃𝐼  
0.036 0.040 0.019 0.028 0.031 0.012             
(0.024) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.025) (0.034)             
𝐹𝐷𝐼  𝑃𝑃𝐼  
            0.412*** 0.048** 0.053*** 0.057** 0.045* 0.052** 
            (0.138) (0.022) (0.020) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) 
Labour productivity 
0.508*** 0.523*** 0.454** 0.514*** 0.519*** 0.462** 0.612*** 0.556*** 0.485** 0.541*** 0.552*** 0.496** 
(0.179) (0.186) (0.199) (0.192) (0.198) (0.213) (0.154) (0.179) (0.194) (0.185) (0.194) (0.209) 
Trade openness 
0.017*** 0.002 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.004 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.005* 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.005** 0.017*** 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
Inflation 
0.690*** 0.548*** 0.828*** 0.599*** 0.460** 0.743*** 0.738*** 0.519*** 0.820*** 0.577*** 0.436** 0.735*** 
(0.197) (0.177) (0.245) (0.201) (0.183) (0.246) (0.207) (0.189) (0.269) (0.218) (0.193) (0.274) 
Monetary Conditions 
Index 
-0.626*** -0.766*** -0.653***       -0.491*** -0.638*** -0.523***       
(0.129) (0.113) (0.179)       (0.095) (0.085) (0.096)       
Interbank 
rates/EURIBOR 
      -0.280*** -0.419*** -0.319**       -0.265*** -0.370*** -0.270*** 
      (0.098) (0.091) (0.138)       (0.074) (0.084) (0.094) 
Financial crisis dummy 
-2.447*** -2.040*** -2.115*** -2.452*** -2.084*** -2.133*** -2.508*** -1.988*** -2.065*** -2.407*** -2.002*** -2.050*** 
(0.687) (0.601) (0.462) (0.694) (0.614) (0.483) (0.639) (0.577) (0.448) (0.681) (0.594) (0.467) 
Constant 
1.412* 2.061*** 1.219 0.391 1.074* 0.236 0.691* 1.156*** 0.471 0.326 0.653 -0.024 
(0.733) (0.704) (0.760) (0.612) (0.629) (0.647) (0.419) (0.424) (0.367) (0.364) (0.433) (0.366) 
Observations 204 204 204 216 216 216 204 204 204 216 216 216 
AR (2) 0.043 0.026 0.016 0.074 0.044 0.023 0.049 0.029 0.019 0.090 0.049 0.026 
Hansen 0.018 0.020 0.017 0.019 0.021 0.019 0.010 0.023 0.023 0.025 0.024 0.031 
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4.3.3 Interaction between development of financial institutions and 
macroprudential policy 
In this chapter, I employ the extended model specification (equation 4.3) to focus 
on interaction between development of financial institutions and macroprudential policy 
and its implications for economic growth. The sub-index of financial institutions 
development measures how developed they are in terms of depth, access and efficiency. 
The depth of financial institutions development is proxied by private-credit to GDP and 
assets of other financial institutions to GDP, the access to financial institutions is proxied 
by the number of bank branches and ATMs per 100 000 adults and he efficiency aspect 
relies on efficiency in intermediating savings to investment, operational efficiency 
measures and profitability measures (Svirydzenka, 2016). All models work with balanced 
data for 2000-2017 period.  
The results (Table 4.4) show that the coefficients of financial institutions 
development sub-index (third line) are positive, but not statistically significant (except 
columns 2d and 2f). To rephrase it, the developments in the depth, access and efficiency 
of financial institutions do not have an impact economic growth.  The coefficients of 
macroprudential policy (fourth and fifth line) are all negative, but only three of them are 
statistically significant (columns 1b, 2a and 2b). The coefficients of the 𝑀𝑃𝐼 (columns 
1a-1f) indicate that growing frequency of use of macroprudential policy instruments 
limits economic growth. While macroprudential policy aims at ensuring sustainable 
growth by targeting financial stability, the growing use of its instruments slows down 
economic growth, because the credit-based measures limit the developments in this sector 
to prevent possible crises and their impacts. In the case of the 𝑃𝑃𝐼 (columns 2a-2f), the 
coefficients implicate that the more restrictive macroprudential policy, the slower 
economic growth. Implementation of restrictive macroprudential policy measures limits 
the growth by restricting the levels of credit which curb investment and consumption in 
the economy.  
For the interaction term (𝐹𝐷𝐼_𝐹𝐼  𝑀𝑃𝐼 and 𝐹𝐷𝐼_𝐹𝐼  𝑃𝑃𝐼 respectively), all 
coefficients are negative and not statistically significant. This implicates that when the 
macroprudential policy measures limit the development of financial institutions, it may 
dampen the positive impact on economic growth. To sum it up, development of financial 
institutions in terms of depth, access, and efficiency coupled with restrictive MPP do not 




Table 4.4: Results for the extended specification with 𝐹𝐷𝐼_𝐹𝐼 ×  𝑀𝑃𝑃 interaction term 
Source: own elaboration in STATA  
Note: Driscoll and Kraay (1998) robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively
































-0.230* -0.161 -0.222** -0.173 -0.122 -0.160 -0.212 -0.144 -0.215* -0.145 -0.091 -0.135 
(0.135) (0.133) (0.105) (0.135) (0.129) (0.112) (0.138) (0.130) (0.119) (0.140) (0.129) (0.127) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼 (institutions) 
0.090 0.056 0.086 0.127 0.093 0.132 0.065 0.057 0.066 0.077* 0.069 0.087* 
(0.084) (0.060) (0.068) (0.101) (0.078) (0.091) (0.046) (0.047) (0.053) (0.046) (0.046) (0.051) 
Macroprudential Policy 
Index 
-0.201 -0.310** -0.223 -0.059 -0.172 -0.091             
(0.192) (0.141) (0.202) (0.157) (0.119) (0.168)             
Prudential Policy Index 
            -0.115** -0.136** -0.023 -0.067 -0.093 0.014 
            (0.051) (0.055) (0.069) (0.059) (0.061) (0.066) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼_𝐹𝐼  𝑀𝑃𝐼 
-0.010 0.011 -0.009 -0.027 -0.006 -0.026             
(0.056) (0.045) (0.049) (0.064) (0.052) (0.060)             
𝐹𝐷𝐼_𝐹𝐼  𝑃𝑃𝐼  
            -0.058 -0.065 -0.082 -0.079 -0.081 -0.094 
            (0.055) (0.055) (0.068) (0.059) (0.059) (0.070) 
Labour productivity 
0.492*** 0.509*** 0.441** 0.494** 0.502** 0.445** 0.527*** 0.552*** 0.481** 0.533*** 0.550*** 0.493** 
(0.185) (0.192) (0.203) (0.197) (0.203) (0.215) (0.173) (0.178) (0.188) (0.185) (0.190) (0.200) 
Trade openness 
0.015*** 0.001 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.003 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.004** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.004*** 0.016*** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Inflation 
0.659*** 0.519*** 0.813*** 0.560*** 0.426** 0.718*** 0.623*** 0.480** 0.790*** 0.520** 0.390* 0.694** 
(0.210) (0.191) (0.266) (0.210) (0.193) (0.264) (0.218) (0.196) (0.286) (0.223) (0.200) (0.293) 
Monetary Conditions 
Index 
-0.604*** -0.744*** -0.637***       -0.538*** -0.620*** -0.497***       
(0.125) (0.111) (0.177)       (0.075) (0.087) (0.093)       
Interbank 
rates/EURIBOR 
      -0.285*** -0.417*** -0.329***       -0.273*** -0.368*** -0.269*** 
      (0.085) (0.085) (0.118)       (0.068) (0.076) (0.076) 
Financial crisis dummy 
-2.550*** -2.148*** -2.267*** -2.525*** -2.173*** -2.244*** -2.443*** -2.021*** -2.143*** -2.390*** -2.006*** -2.081*** 
(0.741) (0.659) (0.556) (0.747) (0.670) (0.571) (0.671) (0.585) (0.500) (0.687) (0.605) (0.520) 
Constant 
1.503** 2.137*** 1.314* 0.588 1.227* 0.426 0.905** 1.168*** 0.461 0.395 0.691 0.009 
(0.740) (0.714) (0.773) (0.613) (0.644) (0.620) (0.370) (0.438) (0.389) (0.366) (0.429) (0.377) 
Observations 204 204 204 216 216 216 204 204 204 216 216 216 
AR (2) 0.020 0.016 0.009 0.050 0.040 0.016 0.021 0.014 0.010 0.052 0.032 0.020 
Hansen 0.012 0.014 0.010 0.012 0.014 0.012 0.016 0.018 0.016 0.020 0.020 0.023 
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4.3.4 Interaction between development of financial markets and 
macroprudential policy 
In this chapter, I employ the extended model specification (equation 4.3) to focus 
on interaction between development of financial markets and macroprudential policy and 
its implications for economic growth. The financial markets development sub-index 
measures improvements in depth, access and efficiency of stock markets and debt 
markets. The depth aspect contains indicators on size and activity of the stock market and 
volume of debt securities (international and domestic), the access is proxied by the 
percentage of market capitalisation outside of top 10 largest companies and number of 
issuers on the domestic and external debt market per 100 000 adults and the efficiency 
sub-index relies on the stock market turnover ratio (value of stocks traded to stock market 
capitalisation) (Svirydzenka, 2016). All models work with balanced data for 2000-2017 
period.  
The results (Table 4.5) indicate that development of financial markets is 
positively associated with economic growth and that the coefficients are statistically 
significant in half of the cases (columns 2a-2c). The financial market indicator focuses 
on stock market and debt market development. The developments in stock markets have 
strong and significant positive relationship with economic growth, as effective stock and 
debt markets attract more investment by financing productive projects, mobilise domestic 
savings, allocate capital proficiency, reduce risk by its diversifying and facilitate better 
exchange of goods and services (Caporale et al., 2004; de Bondt, 2002). To sum it up, 
faster developments in depth, access and efficiency of financial markets are positive 
contributors to economic growth. Among the two analysed sub-indices, the developments 
in financial markets are more important for economic growth, as they lead the overall 
growth contributions. The coefficients of macroprudential policy are negative (except 
columns 2c and 2f), but also not statistically significant. In the case of 𝑀𝑃𝐼, the 
relationship between more frequent use of macroprudential policy instruments and 
economic growth indicate that macroprudential policy prevents the build-ups of excessive 
and unsustainable levels of private and public debt to ensure financial stability, resulting 
in limits in economic growth. For the 𝑃𝑃𝐼, the results implicate that the more restrictive 
policy measures are implemented, the more limited is the economic growth.  
For the interaction term (𝐹𝐷𝐼_𝐹𝑀  𝑀𝑃𝐼 and 𝐹𝐷𝐼_𝐹𝑀  𝑃𝑃𝐼 respectively), all 
coefficients have positive sign and are statistically significant (except column 1f). The 
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findings implicate that more frequent use of macroprudential policy measures (captured 
by the 𝑀𝑃𝐼) together with financial markets development contributes positively to 
economic growth. However, it is notable that the interaction partially offsets the overall 
impacts. When the development of financial markets enters the model separately, its 
growth by 1 implicates GDP growth by 3.6 p.p., but when the sub-index interacts with 
more frequent use of macroprudential policy, the GDP growth is only by 2.7 pp. (column 
1a). In the case when the effect of macroprudential measures is considered, separate 
financial markets development implicates GDP growth by 8.7 p.p., while implementation 
of restrictive macroprudential policy instruments limits the GDP growth to 4.8 pp. 
(column 2a). Debt overhang is a crucial determinant of the likelihood of financial crises, 
as a resulting negative shock to the economy may trigger a negative spiral. Therefore, 
macroprudential policy should serve as the first line of defence against excessive debt. In 
this case, more frequent implementation of macroprudential policy measures limits the 
risks of development and leads to a positive relationship between the interaction term and 
economic growth. The development of financial markets has allowed financial 
institutions to take on higher leverage while having better risk management and tolerance. 
However, high leverage increases the vulnerabilities of debtors (and thus creditors) to 
macroeconomic volatility and heightened uncertainty. Restrictive macroprudential policy 
reduces and diversifies the risks, so the interaction between policy interventions and 
financial markets development has a positive impact on economic growth. 
Macroprudential measures weakens the impact of financial development but ensures 






































-0.292** -0.221* -0.286*** -0.252* -0.196 -0.240** -0.265** -0.199* -0.262*** -0.218* -0.162 -0.201** 
(0.127) (0.123) (0.088) (0.131) (0.121) (0.098) (0.116) (0.110) (0.083) (0.117) (0.107) (0.092) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼 (markets) 
0.036* 0.037 0.064** 0.035 0.039* 0.059* 0.087*** 0.085*** 0.100*** 0.086*** 0.084*** 0.095*** 
(0.021) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.033) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) 
Macroprudential Policy 
Index 
-0.188 -0.303** -0.207 -0.022 -0.147 -0.052             
(0.197) (0.145) (0.205) (0.161) (0.120) (0.173)             
Prudential Policy Index 
            -0.075 -0.093 0.025 -0.008 -0.036 0.076 
            (0.063) (0.061) (0.095) (0.061) (0.056) (0.083) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼_𝐹𝑀  𝑀𝑃𝐼  
0.027** 0.025* 0.015 0.025** 0.023* 0.015             
(0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015)             
𝐹𝐷𝐼_𝐹𝑀  𝑃𝑃𝐼  
            0.048** 0.042** 0.049** 0.050** 0.043* 0.050** 
            (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
Labour productivity 
0.519*** 0.534*** 0.466** 0.525*** 0.530*** 0.474** 0.567*** 0.584*** 0.520*** 0.571*** 0.581*** 0.528*** 
(0.175) (0.181) (0.194) (0.188) (0.193) (0.210) (0.149) (0.159) (0.169) (0.162) (0.172) (0.182) 
Trade openness 
0.017*** 0.002 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.004 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.004** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.005*** 0.017*** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Inflation 
0.718*** 0.572*** 0.858*** 0.631*** 0.488*** 0.775*** 0.685*** 0.538*** 0.844*** 0.600*** 0.459** 0.762*** 
(0.197) (0.177) (0.246) (0.203) (0.183) (0.247) (0.209) (0.187) (0.268) (0.217) (0.193) (0.275) 
Monetary Conditions 
Index 
-0.617*** -0.755*** -0.639***       -0.537*** -0.627*** -0.508***       
(0.133) (0.110) (0.183)       (0.065) (0.079) (0.092)       
Interbank 
rates/EURIBOR 
     -0.268*** -0.408*** -0.302**      -0.252*** -0.358*** -0.252*** 
     (0.099) (0.093) (0.139)      (0.076) (0.086) (0.098) 
Financial crisis dummy 
-2.516*** -2.103*** -2.189*** -2.530*** -2.153*** -2.217*** -2.454*** -2.031*** -2.114*** -2.458*** -2.057*** -2.117*** 
(0.686) (0.599) (0.468) (0.697) (0.615) (0.491) (0.636) (0.550) (0.438) (0.642) (0.561) (0.452) 
Constant 
1.377* 2.024*** 1.167 0.342 1.031* 0.172 0.804** 1.097*** 0.396 0.259 0.592 -0.099 
(0.751) (0.701) (0.770) (0.609) (0.619) (0.631) (0.324) (0.388) (0.363) (0.347) (0.404) (0.359) 
Observations 204 204 204 216 216 216 204 204 204 216 216 216 
AR (2) 0.033 0.019 0.013 0.048 0.027 0.018 0.050 0.023 0.016 0.062 0.029 0.018 
Hansen 0.017 0.020 0.016 0.016 0.019 0.016 0.019 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.026 
 
Table 4.5: Results for the extended specification with 𝐹𝐷𝐼_𝐹𝑀 ×  𝑀𝑃𝑃 interaction term 
Source: own elaboration in STATA 
Note: Driscoll and Kraay (1998) robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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4.3.5 Robustness check 
In the previous chapters, I use the system-GMM techniques, following Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) and execute them using “xtabond2” 
command in Stata (Roodman, 2009). To check for robustness, I compare the estimates 
with the fixed effects estimates obtained by using “xtreg” command in Stata.  The static 
panel data regression is based on the following equation: 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽∆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + ∆ 𝑖𝑡 
 
(4.4) 
where 𝑖 and 𝑡 represent country and time period indexes and the dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡  is 
a measure of economic growth. Furthermore, 𝛼𝑖  and 𝛼𝑡 are country and fixed time effects 
which include unobserved cross-country heterogeneity as well as unobserved factors that 
are common across countries but vary over time. The structure of control variables is 
similar to the system-GMM regression, only the monetary policy indicators enter in their 
original values (compared to the use of lags in system-GMM regressions). The system-
GMM regression is based on (4.3) without any changes. 
The results of the robustness check for the baseline specification (Table 4.6) 
confirm that the fixed-effects results are less robust compared to the GMM estimates. The 
significance of financial development is stronger in the fixed effects models with the MCI 
as monetary policy stance (columns 1a-1c), while the use of interbank rates/EURIBOR 
(columns 1d-1f) results in comparable results across the methods. The main differences 
between the two specifications are in coefficients of monetary policy indicators (fifth and 
sixth line), because in the static model, I do not employ the lagged variables. Therefore, 
the static model does not correspond with economic reality, as monetary policy 
transmission is lagged and this needs to be included in the model specification. For other 
control variables, the results are consistent, proving that the Nickell bias is marginal in 
this context. However, the use of static model specification is not possible, because of the 
Woolridge test results (eleventh line). The p-values for Woolridge test for autocorrelation 
in panel data are statistically significant, so the null hypothesis on presence of no first-
order autocorrelation is rejected.  
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  (1a) (2a) (1b) (2b) (1c) (2c) (1d) (2d) (1e) (2e) (1f) (2f) 
Dependent variable GDP growth GDP per capita growth GVA growth GDP growth GDP per capita growth GVA growth 
Method FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM 
Financial 
development index 
0.088** 0.134*** 0.082* 0.132*** 0.077* 0.153*** 0.063** 0.132*** 0.060** 0.129*** 0.073** 0.135*** 
(0.042) (0.021) (0.044) (0.022) (0.044) (0.021) (0.029) (0.014) (0.029) (0.014) (0.032) (0.023) 
Labour productivity 
0.533*** 0.520*** 0.558*** 0.542*** 0.487*** 0.468** 0.541*** 0.605*** 0.555*** 0.623*** 0.499*** 0.540*** 
(0.066) (0.177) (0.068) (0.186) (0.069) (0.197) (0.054) (0.144) (0.055) (0.143) (0.061) (0.205) 
Trade openness 
0.032** 0.019*** 0.029* 0.005** 0.041** 0.018*** 0.019* 0.019*** 0.014 0.007** 0.026** 0.020*** 
(0.016) (0.004) (0.016) (0.002) (0.016) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (0.012) (0.005) 
Inflation 
0.427*** 0.684*** 0.299** 0.541*** 0.487*** 0.825*** -0.036 0.291*** -0.091 0.250*** 0.216** 0.606** 
(0.121) (0.208) (0.125) (0.189) (0.127) (0.258) (0.063) (0.094) (0.064) (0.083) (0.104) (0.237) 
Monetary Conditions 
Index 
0.013 -0.496*** 0.026 -0.575*** 0.087 -0.518***             
(0.119) (0.059) (0.123) (0.073) (0.124) (0.110)             
Interbank 
rate/EURIBOR 
            0.030 -0.135*** 0.066 -0.125*** 0.321*** -0.042 
            (0.046) (0.039) (0.046) (0.042) (0.090) (0.057) 
Financial crisis 
dummy 
-2.646*** -2.430*** -2.414*** -2.004*** -2.455*** -2.089*** -2.734*** -2.476*** -2.563*** -2.234*** -2.318*** -2.476*** 
(0.326) (0.686) (0.337) (0.596) (0.340) (0.458) (0.256) (0.691) (0.259) (0.619) (0.303) (0.561) 
Constant 
-0.992 0.719** -1.268 0.974** -1.729* 0.458 0.841 1.034*** 0.513 0.955*** -0.754 0.030 
(1.000) (0.359) (1.034) (0.430) (1.043) (0.341) (0.545) (0.372) (0.551) (0.317) (0.756) (0.343) 
Observations 204 204 204 204 204 204 381 381 381 381 252 252 
R-squared (overall) 0.539  0.412  0.454  0.476  0.435  0.544  
Woolridge 0.002  0.001  0.018  0.000  0.000  0.006  
AR (2)   0.042  0.024  0.016  0.041  0.030  0.053 
Hansen   0.024  0.026  0.022  0.009  0.009  0.029 
 
Table 4.6: Robustness check for the baseline specification 
Source: own elaboration in STATA 
Note: Standard errors clustered at the country-level (fixed-effect estimations) and Driscoll and Kraay (1998) robust standard errors (GMM estimations) are in parentheses. Statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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4.4 Discussion of the results 
My results indicate that there is a positive and significant relationship between 
financial development and economic growth. Faster development in depth, access and 
efficiency of financial institutions and markets leads to faster economic growth. When I 
separate the two aspects, financial institutions development and financial markets 
development, it can be concluded that the positive finance-growth relationship is driven 
mainly by improvements in financial markets, as improvements in financial institutions 
do not have a statistically significant relationship with economic growth. The results are 
in line with three meta-analyses on the finance-growth relationship from Arestis et al. 
(2014), Valickova et al. (2015) and Biljsma et al. (2018). Furthermore, they prove the 
decreasing effect of financial development on economic growth, showing that the studies 
with pre-crisis estimates are overly optimistic. The outcomes of my research contribute 
to the research on this topic mainly by employing a composite indicator for financial 
development, as many previous studies use a single proxy variable or combination of 
different proxies. I use the composite index and its sub-indices because reliance on one 
indicator may be misleading, since financial development is a complex phenomenon, so 
different variables may offer conflicting information. Therefore, the use of composite 
indicator is favourable, as it provides a broader view of the conditions in the financial 
sector in the analysed countries. My approach is in line with studies reviewed in this 
thesis, e. g. on monetary policy (Babecká-Kucharčuková et al., 2016; Frait and Malovaná, 
2017), which also work with composite indicators. 
The finance-growth relationship remains positive in all specifications of my 
model. However, the post-crisis regulatory measures of macroprudential nature influence 
this nexus when they enter the model. The relationship between macroprudential policy 
and economic growth is twofold and sensitive to the indicator capturing implementation 
of macroprudential policy instruments. Sensitivity of research outcomes to specific 
modelling assumptions is confirmed by the meta-analysis of Fidrmuc and Lind (2018). 
When the focus is on cumulative use of policy actions without considering their effect, 
macroprudential policy has negative effect on economic growth. This indicates that 
growing use of macroprudential policy actions, which aim at limiting systemic risk and 
probability and severity of crises, negatively affects economic growth because the 
limitations outweigh the benefits of such policy actions. These results are in accordance 
with Sánchez and Rohn (2016) who employ the same indicator and conclude that more 
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frequent use of macroprudential policies may be associated with lower economic growth. 
When the macroprudential policy indicator includes frequency of use together with 
effects of implemented instruments, the contribution of macroprudential policy to 
economic growth is positive. The employment of this indicator reflects that 
macroprudential policy actions limit excessive cumulation of risk, make financial crises 
less possible and severe, thus ensuring financial stability which is a prerequisite for 
sustainable growth. These results are in line with Boar et al. (2017) who conclude that 
more active macroprudential policies are associated with higher growth rates and with 
Neanidis (2019) who state that regulatory policy rules are beneficial to long-run economic 
growth. To sum it up, appropriate regulatory measures can be beneficial if their effect is 
properly assessed. In this regard, macroprudential policy reduces the potential for harm 
without imposing any costs by ensuring that the financial institutions have more equity 
to absorb their losses. With the help of macroprudential policy, the risk of crises is limited 
together with their severity and costs to the society.  
The implications of interactions between financial development and 
macroprudential policy for economic growth show that the role of macroprudential policy 
outweighs the role of financial development which is in accordance with findings of 
Bernier and Plouffe (2019). The results of the interactions prove that the role of 
macroprudential policy measures is twofold. On the one hand, macroprudential policy 
limits the potential disruptions in financial sector resulting from financial development 
and dampens impacts of such disruptions to the economy. More active use of 
macroprudential policy reduces costs and severity of financial crises and ensures financial 
stability. Therefore, the interaction between financial development and macroprudential 
policy has positive relationship with economic growth. These findings are in line with 
those of Agénor et al. (2018) who show that growth may be promoted when prudential 
policies mitigate financial risks to the economy. On the other hand, tightening nature of 
macroprudential policy may overly limit the process of financial development, leading 
the interaction to a negative relationship with economic growth. Macroprudential policy 
measures slow down the effects of financial development to an extent when their 
interaction harms economic growth. Therefore, tightening of activities in the financial 
sector is negatively associated with financial development (the possibility to diversify the 
risk into other financial activities is limited). Slower financial development affected by 
macroprudential policy tightening of a preventive nature overly limits excessive credit 
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and risk, thus slowing down economic growth. These results are in line with the meta-
analysis of Fidrmuc and Lind (2018); however, the macroprudential policy indicator 
which I use captures different policy instruments, while the meta-analysis only focuses 
on impacts of capital requirements. In the regressions which explore interactions between 
development of financial institutions, macroprudential policy and economic growth, the 
interaction of the first two was positive in all cases, indicating that the interaction between 
growing frequency of use of restrictive macroprudential measures and development of 
financial institutions leads to faster economic growth. 
4.5 Summary of the chapter 
In this chapter, I elaborate on the theoretical framework, data and stylised facts 
and analyse the implications of financial development and macroprudential policy for 
economic growth in the selected panel of countries. 
The first part of the chapter is theoretical, as I explain different approaches to 
panel data regression, together with methodology and research design I employ. Based 
on all the presented knowledge, I specify the models – the baseline specification focusing 
solely on the finance-growth relationship and the extended specifications which add 
macroprudential policy and the interactions to the model. Furthermore, I summarise and 
analyse all input data for the models. 
The second part reports results of the different model specifications. In these, 
I analyse the coefficients in terms of sign, size and significance and I elaborate on the 
economic impacts of the values. Furthermore, I explain how each of the variables entering 
the model influences economic growth and which transmission channels are used and 
relate my findings to relevant studies from the past. Among all the models, the most 
statistically significant and economically correct results are obtained when interbank 
rate/EURIBOR captures the monetary policy and when the macroprudential policy 
indicator contains the frequency of use of the instruments together with the effects in their 
changes.  
Third, I conduct a robustness check where I compare the results of GMM 
estimation for the baseline specification with static fixed-effects regression estimates. As 
expected, the fixed-effects estimates are less robust compared to the system-GMM ones. 
Furthermore, the static fixed-effects regression results contain first-order autocorrelation 
which is detected by performing Woolridge test.  
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Lastly, I compare my results to the outcomes from the literature. In the discussion, 
I elaborate on each of the analysed phenomena and their implications for economic 
growth, both separately and jointly. I prove that my findings of positive finance-growth 
relationship, with financial markets leading the growth is in line with literature, that the 
implications of macroprudential policy on economic growth are twofold and that the 
direction of the relationship between financial development, macroprudential policy and 
economic growth is sensitive to model specification and choice of variables.  
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5 Conclusion 
The literature on the finance-growth relationship has considerably evolved 
throughout the years, because financial development remains to be an important condition 
for economic growth. After the Global Financial Crisis in 2009, there has been a growing 
need for regulatory practices aiming at preventing the build-ups of risks to limit 
possibilities, severities and costs of further crises. As a result, macroprudential policy was 
introduced and has been implemented and its interactions and implications have been 
analysed, both theoretically and empirically.  
My thesis focused on separate and joint implications of financial development and 
macroprudential policy for economic growth in the European Monetary Union on 
a sample of 12 countries. The main aim of this thesis was to identify such implications 
from both theoretical and empirical perspective. The theoretical part provided 
a framework with definitions and measures of the analysed phenomena, together with 
a thorough review of existing literature on various aspects of the finance-growth 
relationship and interactions of financial development, macroprudential policy and 
economic growth. In the data and stylised facts part, the focus was on the panel of 
countries, implementation of monetary and macroprudential policy and measures of the 
analysed phenomena.  
In the empirical part, I employed the dynamic panel data regressions with GMM 
estimator to analyse the finance-growth relationship and the interactions between 
financial development, macroprudential policy and economic growth in the panel of 
countries. My results confirmed that there is a positive relationship between financial 
development and economic growth in the baseline model which excludes 
macroprudential policy. Among the two-analysed sub-indices of financial institutions and 
financial markets development respectively, I found that the developments in financial 
markets are more important for economic growth, as they lead the overall growth 
contributions. In the models extended by macroprudential policy measures, my results 
indicated that more frequent use of macroprudential policy measures seems to moderately 
reduce economic growth. When I used a measure containing the effect of implemented 
policy measures, the implications for growth are positive, hinting that macroprudential 
tightening is beneficial for growth. The interactions between financial development and 
macroprudential policy offset the impact of financial development on growth when 
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entered separately, but the overall relationship is still positive, as macroprudential policy 
impacts growth by mitigating possible crises and limiting their costs to the economy.  
To sum it up, macroprudential policy enables stable developments in the financial 
environment which positively contributes to sustainable growth. In a monetary union, 
country-specific imbalances cannot be offset by the uniform monetary policy and hardly 
by the institutionally constrained fiscal policy. Therefore, macroprudential policy 
provides the countries with a set of tools that can be tailored to specific risks on a national 
level which have smaller implementation lags than other public policies to offset 
divergences in national financial cycles and promote sustainable growth.  
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